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TAX, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND NORMS
STEVEN A. BANK*
This paper examines the use of federal tax provisions to effect changes in state law corporate governance.  
There is a growing academic controversy over these provisions, fueled in part by their popularity among 
legislators as a method of addressing the recent spate of corporate scandals.  In order to better understand 
and distinguish between the possible uses of tax as a tool of corporate governance, this paper takes a 
historical approach by focusing on two measures enacted during the New Deal – the undistributed profits 
tax in 1936 and the overhaul of the tax-free reorganization provisions in 1934 – and considers why the 
former was so much more controversial and less sustainable than the latter.  While some of the difference 
can be explained by the different political and economic circumstances surrounding each proposal, this 
paper argues that the divergence in the degree of opposition can be explained in part by an examination of 
the extent to which each provision threatened an underlying norm, or longstanding standard, of corporate 
behavior.  The paper goes on to test this norms-based explanation against several recent attempts to enact 
corporate governance-oriented tax provisions and concludes that it has modern relevance.  The 
implication is that while Congress may use the Tax Code to reinforce existing norms of corporate 
behavior, it is likely to be less successful when it tries to use the Code to change existing norms or 
introduce new ones.
I. INTRODUCTION
President Bush's proposal to end double taxation, which was justified in part because it 
would increase dividends and thereby improve corporate "accountability,"1 was only the latest 
example of the federal government's effort to use the Internal Revenue Code as a tool to modify 
corporate behavior.  In recent years, Congress has enacted or introduced a number of corporate 
governance-motivated tax provisions – from limiting deductions for allegedly excessive 
executive compensation and imposing excise taxes on the receipt of so-called “greenmail” 
payments during takeovers to denying deductions both for stock options that have been expensed 
*
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1
 U.S. Treasury, Eliminate the Double Taxation of Corporate Earnings, available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/bluebook.pdf (last visited February 2, 2004) ("[T]he proposal will enhance 
corporate governance by eliminating the current bias against the payment of dividends.  Dividends can provide 
evidence of a corporation's underlying financial health and enable investors to evaluate more readily a corporation's 
financial condition.  This, in turn, increases the accountability of corporate management to its investors.").
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for accounting purposes and for punitive damage payments.2 In fact, almost since the inception 
of the corporate income tax, Congress has recognized its potential to serve as a de facto system of 
federal corporate law.  Proponents of the earliest corporate income tax in 1894 predicted that one 
of its benefits would be the “salutary” influence it would have on corporations by establishing a 
means of federal oversight.3  When President Taft later proposed an excise tax on corporations in 
1909, he noted that one of the merits of the tax was “the federal supervision which must be 
exercised in order to make the law effective over the annual accounts and business transactions of 
all corporations.”4  Federal taxation was a means to preempt the traditional state role in the 
regulation of corporations without actually establishing a system of federal incorporation.5
Despite its long history, the attempt to regulate corporations through the tax system has 
had only mixed results.  In many cases, Congress' corporate governance-motivated tax reform 
efforts have failed miserably.  This is not to say that tax reform has failed to actually modify 
corporate behavior for at least a brief time, although this may be the case in some instances.  
Rather many of the tax provisions introduced or enacted as part of a corporate governance reform
effort have simply failed, in the words of Mark Roe, to "survive" in the face of fierce corporate 
2 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162(m) (limiting the deductibility of non-performance based executive compensation to $1 
million); 5881 (levying an excise tax on the receipt of “greenmail,” or above-market payments by target management to 
a shareholder mounting a hostile takeover bid); 280G & 4999 (disallowing deductions of certain “golden parachute” 
payments, or payments to departing target executives upon a change of control, and imposing an excise tax on their 
receipt); Ending the Double Standard for Stock Options Act: S. 1940, 107th Cong. (2002) (bill introduced by Senators 
Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and John McCain (R.-Ariz.) to only allow corporations to deduct nonqualified stock options to 
the extent of the amount treated as expenses for purposes of reporting earnings); Jumpstart Our Business Strength 
(JOBS) Act:  S. 1637, 108th Cong. (2003) (bill introduced by Senators Charles Grassley (R.-Iowa) and Max Baucus (D-
Mont.) to, among other things, end deductibility for punitive damages and to require CEO signatures on tax returns).  
Treasury has not always been a willing partner in Congress' decision to use the Tax Code as a tool to influence 
corporate governance.  See Sheryl Stratton, Treasury:  Fix Executive Comp Abuse But Lay Off the Tax Code, 99 TAX 
NOTES 191 (2003) (reporting on comments made by Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy Pamela F. Olson in 
opposition to efforts to use the Code to combat Enron executive's abuse of the compensation system).
  The U.S. is not alone in its effort to use the tax system as a tool of corporate governance.  During the post-World War 
II-era, the U.K. has instituted no less than four major reforms of the corporate tax system that can be traced back to the 
desire to influence corporate behavior.  See MERVYN KING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE CORPORATION 5 (1977); SVEN 
STEINMO, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY:  SWEDISH, BRITISH, AND AMERICAN APPROACHES TO FINANCING THE MODERN 
STATE 47-48 (1993). 
3
 William L. Wilson, The Income Tax on Corporations, 158 N. AM. L. REV. 7 (1894) (Wilson was the chairman of the 
House Ways & Means Committee).
4
 44 CONG. REC. 3344 (1909) (message from President Taft).  See also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation 
and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990).
5
 This is not to suggest that federal incorporation itself has never been considered.  Progressive-era reformers called for 
an explicit federal incorporation requirement in the face of a perceived decline in state corporation laws, but such 
proposals were defeated.  See MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-
1916 203-85 (1988); Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Comment, Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit:  The Progressive 
Federal Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory State, 77 VA. L. REV. 603, 622-23 (1991).  In large part, 
the securities laws enacted in 1933 and 1934 served as a de facto federal corporations law.  See Robert B. Thompson & 
Hilary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:  Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 869 
(2003).
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resistance.6 If they survived enactment and were not technically repealed within a few years, they 
have been effectively rendered useless or counterproductive and their continued existence has 
been the subject of much criticism.7
Notwithstanding such criticism, recent observers suggest that in some cases tax can be an 
effective ally in the fight to reform corporate governance.  David Schizer, for example, argued 
that a variety of tax rules have served as an effective hindrance to executive hedging 
transactions.8  Reuven Avi-Yonah goes further, arguing that the corporate tax, and, by implication 
corporate rates, can be used "to control the excessive accumulation of power in the hands of 
corporate management."9 This normative conclusion draws support from recent studies in the 
economics literature that demonstrate the corporate governance benefits of strong tax 
enforcement by reducing the level of "managerial diversion" of corporate assets.10 Given the 
existing political support and academic controversy surrounding the use of tax as a tool of 
corporate governance, the challenge is to more fully investigate whether some corporate 
governance-motivated tax reforms may be better positioned to succeed than others.
Perhaps the best prism through which to understand the use of taxation to modify 
corporate behavior is the experience of the New Deal.  Not only does it have the advantage of 
historical distance, but the New Deal is replete with examples of corporate governance-oriented 
tax provisions.  During a relatively brief period of time, Congress embarked on an ambitious, but 
ultimately unsuccessful, campaign to change corporate behavior through tax reform.11 Thus, 
between 1932 and 1936, legislators enacted or attempted to enact tax provisions designed to 
restrict the growth of large corporations,12 to eliminate the holding company structure,13 to lower 
6 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS:  THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE
118 (1994).
7 See, e.g., David I. Walker, Tax Incentives Will Not Close Stock Option Accounting Gap, TAX NOTES 851 (2002); 
Susan J. Stabile, Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 90-92 
(1998); Kurt Hartmann, Comment, The Market for Corporate Confusion:  Federal Attempts to Regulate the Market for 
Corporate Control Through the Federal Tax Code, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 159, 199 (1993); James R. Repetti, Corporate 
Governance and Stockholder Abdication:  Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 971, 974 
(1992); Eric A. Lustig, The Emerging Role of the Federal Tax Law in Regulating Hostile Corporate Takeover 
Defenses:  The New Section 5881 Excise Tax on Greenmail, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 789, 792 (1988).  
8 See David Schizer, Executives and Hedging:  The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 440, 446 (2000) (noting the corporate governance benefits of certain tax barriers to executive hedging 
transactions).  
9
 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State:  A Defense of the Corporate Tax 65 (unpublished 
manuscript 2003).
10 See Mihir Desai et al., The Protecting Hand:  Taxation and Corporate Governance 2 (March 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript).
11 See COMMITTEE ON TAXATION OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., FACING THE TAX PROBLEM:  A SURVEY OF 
TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND A PROGRAM FOR THE FUTURE 153-87 (1937) ("Twentieth Century Fund") 
(surveying, in a chapter entitled “Control of Business Organization and Practices,” the New Deal program for the 
regulation of corporations through the tax laws); MARK H. LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM:  THE NEW DEAL 
AND TAXATION, 1933-1939 74-90 (1984).
12 See Revenue Act of 1935, §102(a), 49 Stat. 1014 (graduated marginal rates on corporations).
13 See id. at § 102(h) (reducing the dividends received deduction from one hundred to ninety percent);  Revenue Act of 
1936, § 26(b), 49 Stat. 1648 (reducing the dividends received deduction to eighty-five percent); Revenue Act of 1932, § 
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the amount of executive compensation,14 to force the distribution of dividends,15 and to minimize 
mergers, acquisitions, and other business combinations.16  While some of these corporate 
governance-motivated proposals were enacted amid only mild opposition and remain a part of the 
Code to this day,17 most were either rejected immediately or were repealed within a few years.18
As a case study on the use of tax provisions to regulate corporate governance, this Article 
compares and contrasts two New Deal-era corporate tax provisions – the proposed abolition and 
eventual overhaul of the tax-free reorganization provisions in the Revenue Act of 1934 and the 
enactment of an undistributed profits tax in the Revenue Act of 1936 – where managerial 
resistance spelled the difference between success and failure.  The proposal to abolish or radically 
alter the reorganization provisions, which governed the tax treatment of stock and property 
received in mergers, consolidations, and other business combinations, aroused only limited 
managerial opposition and the resulting provisions have survived virtually intact to this day.  The 
undistributed profits tax, on the other hand, was the target of a vigorous lobbying campaign and 
was repealed after only a few years.  Although both provisions were at least partially justified on 
tax policy grounds, they had significant and publicly acknowledged implications for corporate 
governance and for the independence of managers vis-à-vis their shareholders.  In the former 
case, elimination or tightening of the tax-free reorganization provisions as part of an effort to 
restrict excessive business combinations potentially limited a manager’s ability to expand his 
business through acquisitions.  In the latter case, an undistributed profits tax designed to prevent 
corporate “hoarding” of earnings and profits restricted the free cash flow managers’ counted on 
for capital projects and cash acquisitions.  Managerial opposition to both proposals may reflect 
the problems associated with the shareholders’ delegation of authority to an agent – the manager 
– who is imbued with self-interest,19 but agency cost theory does not entirely explain the 
discrepancy in the degree of opposition.  The question is why managers reacted so differently to 
what appear to be similar threats to managerial independence.  
While changes in the underlying political and economic environment played a role, this 
Article suggests that the divergent reactions can at least partly be attributed to the extent to which 
141(c) (additional tax of three-quarters of one percent for filing a consolidated return);  National Industrial Recovery 
Act of 1933, § 217(e) (raising the additional tax on consolidated returns to one percent); Revenue Act of 1934, § 141 
(raising the additional tax on consolidated returns to two percent for railroad corporations and abolishing the right to 
file consolidated returns for all other corporations).
14 See LEFF, supra note 11, at 87-89 (describing serious proposals in 1932 and 1934 to erect tax limits on executive 
salaries).
15 See Revenue Act of 1936, § 14(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1656 (undistributed profits tax).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 83-143.
17 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 368 (tax-free reorganization provision), 243 (less than 100% exemption for dividends received by 
some corporate shareholders), 11 (graduated marginal rate on corporations).
18 See, e.g., the abolition of the consolidated return and the imposition of an undistributed profits tax.
19
 For a general discussion of the agency cost problem in the economics and finance literature, see Michael C. Jensen, 
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650 (1984); Eugene F. Fama, Agency 
Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory 
of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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each particular proposal threatened an underlying norm of corporate behavior.20  In the case of 
reorganizations, Congress sought to influence transactions that were already regulated by both a 
corporation’s by-laws and the laws of the state of incorporation.  All major acquisitions or sales 
were subject to unanimous shareholder approval in the early years of the corporation; by 1934, at 
least majority approval was still necessary.  Moreover, federal antitrust laws served as an 
additional constraint on merger activity.  Thus, there was no norm supporting a manger’s 
unfettered discretion to engage in acquisitive transactions or to structure such transactions in the 
manner most suitable to the manager’s needs.  By contrast, dividends had always been a matter of 
discretion for a corporation’s board of directors.  While shareholders could seek redress for an 
abuse of that discretion, directors were given wide latitude.  Under then-existing norms, it was 
considered prudent business practice to retain between thirty and fifty cents of every dollar 
earned.21 Although some larger corporations already distributed in excess of that amount and the 
undistributed profits tax as passed was designed to permit corporations to retain a significant 
percentage of profits before the penalty tax was imposed, businesses of all sizes were concerned 
about the threat to their control over corporate finances.  Therefore, while both provisions were 
opposed in part because they were potentially adverse to manager interests, one reason the 
undistributed profits tax was resisted much more strongly was because it threatened the long-
standing norm of managerial control over a corporation's finances.
This corporate norms-based explanation of managerial resistance provides valuable 
insights for the use of tax as a tool of corporate governance.  The implication is that tax measures 
may reinforce existing norms, but are less likely to be successful in establishing new ones.  This 
may explain the fact that while most modern provisions have been nullified by managerial 
opposition,22 some have been more accepted and therefore effective.23  Analyzing the underlying 
norms threatened may also help provide a more reasoned basis for further use of the Code as a 
tool to regulate corporate governance.  In Part I and II, the Article chronicles the development of 
the reorganization provision and undistributed profits tax proposals, respectively, considering 
both their legislative histories and the managerial resistance at each stage.  In Part III, the Article 
explores the possible reasons why the two provisions took such divergent paths.  While 
20
 There has been a recent explosion of interest among corporate law scholars in the field of norm theory. See 
Symposium:  Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001). The term “norms” in this literature is 
generally intended to denote non-legally enforceable conventions of behavior. But See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. 
Wachter, Introduction, Symposium:  Norms and Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1612-13 (2001) (suggesting 
that legal scholars have used the term to refer to both legally and non-legally enforceable arrangements and suggesting 
replacing the term “norms” with the phrase “nonlegally enforceable rules and standards” to end the confusion).  In the 
context of this article, however, the use of the term “norms” is meant to convey non-tax law conventions governing the 
behavior of managers.  Thus, it may mean both non-legally enforceable norms of manager behavior, such as those 
dictated by market expectations, as well as legally enforceable norms, such as judicial decisions or state and federal 
corporate laws governing corporate activity and manager discretion.
21 See SERGEI DOBROVOLSKY, CORPORATE INCOME RETENTION 1915-1943 13 (1951).
22 See Bruce A. Wolk, The Golden Parachute Provisions:  Time for Repeal?, 21 VA. TAX REV. 125, 127 (2001); Steven 
A. Bank, Devaluing Reform:  The Derivatives Market and Executive Compensation, 7 DEPAUL BUS. L. J. 301, 332 
(1995) (“Devaluing Reform”).
23 See Schizer, supra note 8, at 466.
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acknowledging the political and economic changes between 1934 and 1936, the Article focuses 
on a previously unexplored phenomenon – the nature and status of the underlying corporate 
behavior each proposal sought to regulate.  The Article concludes by examining the possible 
implications this analysis may have for modern attempts to use the Code to influence corporate 
behavior. 
II.  TAX-FREE REORGANIZATION PROVISIONS
A. Early history
The tax treatment of the participants to a merger, consolidation, or other reorganization 
was an open question when the first post-Sixteenth Amendment income tax was adopted in 
1913.24  Shareholders claimed that the exchange of stock in a business combination was a change 
in form rather than substance, but nothing in the 1913 Act precluded their taxation.25  Treasury 
officials initially appeared to side with shareholders,26 but soon issued regulations providing that 
exchanges of property for stock might be taxable in certain circumstances.27  Congress eventually 
resolved the issue as part of a general compromise over the timing of realization in property 
exchanges.28  Under § 202(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918, reorganizations were deemed 
realization events, but any gain or loss was deferred until a subsequent taxable sale.29  Although 
this established the principle of the tax-free reorganization, the provision was flawed in several 
respects.30  Most notably, nonrecognition treatment was limited to exchanges of stock having 
equal par values and the provision failed to define the term “reorganization.”31
24
 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.  
25 See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION:  THIRD SERIES 8 (1940); Homer Hendricks, Federal Income 
Tax:  Definition of “Reorganization,” 45 HARV. L. REV. 648, 648 n.1 (1931); Hugh Satterlee, The Income Tax 
Definition of Reorganization, 12 TAX MAG. 639, 639 (1934).
26 See GEORGE E. HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME AND PROFITS TAXES 262 n.20 (1920) (citing Letter from Treasury Dep’t, 
Mar. 8, 1917; I.T.S. 1918, par. 1302).
27
 Treas. Reg. 33 (revised), arts. 101, 118, 119 (1918), 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 182, 187-88 (1918).
28
 The compromise was between proponents of the consumption and accretion models of taxation.  The accretion model 
suggested annual taxation of increases in value, while the consumption model approved taxation only upon a sale in 
which the proceeds were not reinvested.  Shareholders claimed that the former option would work an injustice because 
any gains realized were only “paper” gains, while Congress feared that the latter option would permit virtually 
indefinite deferral of taxation.  The reorganization provisions struck a balance between these two approaches by 
acknowledging the paper gain problem, while recognizing that most types of property exchanges were taxable.  See
Steven A. Bank, Mergers, Taxes, and Historical Realism, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1, 62-63 (2000) (“Mergers”).
29
 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1058 (1919) (“[W]hen in connection with the reorganization, merger, 
or consolidation of a corporation a person receives in place owned by him new stock or securities of no greater 
aggregate par or face value, no gain or loss shall be deemed to occur from the exchange, and the new stock or securities 
received shall be treated as taking the place of the stock, securities, or property exchanged.”).
30 See Steven A. Bank, Taxing Divisive and Disregarded Mergers, 34 GA. L. REV. 1523, 1550-51 (2000).
31
 Id.  Treasury attempted to address the latter flaw by issuing a regulation that outlined the types of transactions that 
were eligible for nonrecognition treatment under § 202(b).  Under Treas. Reg. § 45, nonrecognition treatment was 
available for transactions “where two (or more) corporations unite their properties by either (a) the dissolution of 
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The deficiencies in the first reorganization provision greatly limited its usefulness.  As 
one practitioner later recalled, "[t]he 1918 provisions were impracticable in operation; the then 
status of the law was such as to hamper necessary business adjustments."32  This problem did not 
escape Congress’ attention.  In his testimony before the Senate Finance Committee in September 
of 1921, Dr. T.S. Adams, an economic advisor to the Treasury Department,33 noted that “the 
principal defect of the present law is in blocking desirable business readjustments.”34  According 
to Adams, “[a]ll kinds of business readjustments had been stopped” due to the fear of being 
subject to taxation and transaction activity would continue to stall without clarifying and 
liberalizing the reorganization provisions.35
In the context of a post-World War I economic downturn, the concerns about a threat to 
business reorganizations were understandable.  A sharp drop in the artificially high wartime 
prices, especially in the agricultural sector, ushered in an economic downturn between 1920 and 
1922 that has been referred to as “the last of the ‘depressions’ before the catastrophe of 1929 
occurred.”36  During 1921 alone, approximately 20,000 companies closed and almost five million 
individuals were unemployed.37  A House Ways and Means Committee Report remarked that "the 
exacting of the present excessive sums of taxes from the country contributes in no small degree to 
the depressing influences under which business and industry in general are staggering as an 
aftermath of the World War."38  The Committee explained that the financial ravages of war are 
felt most acutely “after the cessation of hostilities, at which time the demand for war supplies 
terminates, with a resulting shrinkage of values.  The Nation is now passing through the trying 
period of liquidation and readjustment.  The reduction of the tax burdens is essential to business 
recovery."39
corporation B and the sale of its assets to corporation A, or (b) the sale of its property by B to A and the dissolution of 
B, or (c) the sale of the stock of B to A and the dissolution of B, or (d) the merger of B into A, or (e) the consolidation 
of the corporations.”  Treas. Reg. § 45, art. 1567, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 170, 395.  This was consistent with the 
prevailing understanding of the term in the non-bankruptcy context.  See Eric L. Kohler, Reorganizations and the 
Federal Income Tax Law, 4 NAT’L INCOME TAX MAG. 161, 161 (May 1926) (“The current use of the term is reflected in 
part by the definition offered seventeen years ago by Thomas W. Lamont:  ‘a decision brought about usually by a 
company’s success, to enlarge it, to recapitalize it, or to amalgamate it with some other corporation or corporations.”).
32
 Hendricks, supra note 25, at 648 n.1.
33
 Adams, a professor of political economy at Yale, is sometimes called the “father of the 1921 Act.”  Ronald H. 
Jensen, Of Form and Substance:  Tax-Free Incorporations and Other Transactions Under Section 351, 11 VA. TAX 
REV. 349, 383 n.117 (1991).  He was the principal Treasury spokesperson before Congress on tax legislation and was 
considered one of the foremost tax and public finance theorists of his day.  See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. 
O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1029-30 (1997).
34 Hearings on H.R. 8245 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 67th Cong. 29 (1921) (statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, 
advisor to the Treasury Department). 
35 Id. 
36 CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET:  A HISTORY 155 (1997).  See also PAUL, supra note 25, at 21; CHARLES A. 
BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, I AMERICA IN MIDPASSAGE 28 (1939); Jensen, supra note 33, at 386 n.126.
37
 Jensen, supra note 33, at 386 n.126.
38 H.R. REP. NO. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 168.
39 Id.
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Furthermore, merger activity began to slow during this economic downturn.  Although 
the number and size of firms absorbed by merger increased steadily in 1919 and 1920,40 “the pace 
of merger activity subsided somewhat in the depression of 1921.”41  It did not truly resume its 
upward slope after this interruption until the mid-1920s.42 Sheldon Cohen, a former commissioner 
of the Internal Revenue Service, concluded that “[i]n this historical context it is not at all 
surprising that preferential treatment was accorded corporate mergers and consolidations on the 
assumption that the provisions would” encourage business reorganizations.43
  Thus, in the Revenue Act of 1921,44 Congress amended the reorganization provision to 
address some of business’ concerns.45  Under § 202(c)(2) of the 1921 Act, “reorganization” was 
defined to include “a merger or consolidation (including the acquisition by one corporation of at 
least a majority of the voting stock and at least a majority of the total number of shares of all 
other classes of stock of another corporation, or of substantially all the properties of another 
corporation), recapitalization, or mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of a 
corporation (however effected).”46  While this definition was itself flawed because it failed to 
specify the permissible consideration in such transactions,47 from the perspective of business it 
was a vast improvement over the 1918 version.  As both the House Ways and Means and Senate 
Finance Committees emphasized in their respective reports on the 1921 Act, the revised 
reorganization provision “will, by removing a source of grave uncertainty . . . permit business to 
go forward with the readjustments required by existing conditions.”48
The liberalization of the reorganization provisions continued in subsequent revenue 
acts.49  The Revenue Act of 1924 expanded the definition of reorganization to include spin-offs 
40 RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1895-1956 37 tbl. 14.
41 J. KEITH BUTTERS ET AL., EFFECTS OF TAXATION:  CORPORATE MERGERS 292 (1951).
42 JOHN M. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION:  STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY 264 (1972).
43
 Sheldon S. Cohen, Conglomerate Mergers and Taxation, 55 A.B.A. J. 41 (1969).  The 1921 decision to create a 
better environment for mergers and acquisitions should be distinguished from the 1918 decision to provide 
nonrecognition treatment for reorganizations, which was based on the realization compromise between consumption 
and accretion tax visions of the income tax system.  See Bank, Mergers, supra note 28, at 28-34.
44
 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
45
 During the debates on a proposed amendment to the reorganization provision, one senator noted that “when so much 
reorganization is going on in the business world, it is thought by all those interested in the upbuilding of the industries 
of the country at this time that this is a very helpful provision.”  61 CONG. REC. 6563 (1921) (statement of Sen. Watson 
regarding the removal of a provision requiring stock to be of equal par value to qualify for nonrecognition treatment). 
46 Id. at § 202(c)(2).
47
 One commentator referred to this omission as a “blunder of draftsmanship.”  Valentine Brookes, The Continuity of 
Interest in Reorganizations – A Blessing or a Curse, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1946).
48 H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 10 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 168, 176; S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 11 (1921), reprinted 
in 1939-1 C.B. 181, 189.
49 See Roswell Magill, Effect of Taxation on Corporate Policies, 72 U.S. L. Rev. 637, 639 (1938) (“[I]n the early 
twenties, Congress regarded business reorganizations as frequently desirable and often necessary.  Hence, successive 
revenue laws contained increasingly liberal provisions, to permit corporations and stockholders to carry through tax-
free, not only the kinds of reorganizations which the Supreme Court had passed upon, but a number of other kinds.”); 
Income Tax on Corporate Reorganization, 2 N.Y. L. REV. 387, 390 (1924) (“The present statute, as well as that of 
1921, was obviously designed to promulgate a policy more liberal to the taxpayer.”).
(7/13/2004)             TAX, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND NORMS                  9
and split-offs.50  One member of the House Ways and Means Committee explained to Congress 
that this amendment was inserted "to include other usual forms of corporate reorganizations in the 
advance of business, such as the splitting of one corporation into two or more corporations, which 
I may say under the present law would not be permitted except by forming two entirely new 
corporations."51  The 1924 Act also formally extended the exemption from taxation to 
corporations so that they received the benefit of nonrecognition of any gain.52  Although a 
Treasury interpretation had concluded that corporations were exempt under the 1921 Act, the 
Senate Finance Committee explained that "[t]he present ruling of the Treasury Department on this 
question is of doubtful legality and a statutory provision is most necessary."53  This expansion 
was designed to further remove any limits placed on business readjustments by the tax law.  The 
House Ways and Means Committee explained that nonrecognition treatment was granted in order 
to permit “ordinary business transactions” to go forward free from tax constraints and “[i]f it is 
necessary for this reason to exempt from tax the gain realized by the stockholders, it is even more 
necessary to exempt from tax the gain realized by the corporation."54  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the 1924 Act refined the definition of reorganization to make it exclusive for tax 
purposes.55  This helped to provide the certainty businesses sought before engaging in 
reorganizations.  
There were two problems with the liberalization of the reorganization provisions.  First, it 
may have worked too well in encouraging businesses to combine.  One practitioner noted that 
reorganizations became “almost, if not actually, a fetish with many business men and certain 
short- sighted, so-called tax counselors.”56  This contributed to a marked increase in business 
combinations.  Of the 92 active holding companies whose stock was listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange in 1928, 66 had been granted charters since 1910 and, of those companies, at 
50
 Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253 (June 2, 1924), § 203(h)(1) (the term "reorganization means (B) a transfer by a 
corporation of all or part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its 
stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred").  A “spin-off” involves a 
contribution by a corporation of some or all of its assets to another corporation, followed by a distribution of the stock 
of that corporation to all of the first corporation’s existing shareholders as a dividend.  A “split-off” is the same 
transaction as a spin-off except instead of distributing the new corporation’s stock as a dividend, the stock is distributed 
to certain of the first corporation’s shareholders in exchange for their stock in the original corporation.  The result is 
two separate corporations with two separate groups of shareholders.  See 1 MARTIN D. GINSBURG & JACK S. LEVIN, 
MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS par. 1001 (2001). 
51
 65 CONG. REC. 2429 (1924) (statement of Rep. Green).
52 See Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253 (June 2, 1924), § 203(b)(3) ("No gain or loss shall be recognized if a 
corporation a party to a reorganization exchanges property, in pursuance of a plan of reorganization, solely for stock or 
securities in another corporation a party to the reorganization.").
53 S. REP. NO. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. at 276.  See also Milton Sandberg, The 
Income Tax Subsidy to “Reorganizations,” 38 COLUM. L. REV. 98, 102-03 (1938). A regulation promulgated under the 
1921 Act had construed the reorganization provisions so as to exempt corporations as well as their shareholders.  Treas. 
Reg. 62, Art. 1566(b), 24 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 499-500 (1922). 
54 H.R. REP. NO. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. at 250.
55
 The 1924 Act replaced the phrase “the word ‘reorganization’ includes . . .,” with the phrase “the word 
‘reorganization’ means . . ..”  43 Stat. 257.
56
 Kohler, supra note 31, at 180.
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least 34 had received their charters between 1923 and 1928.57  Furthermore, during 1928 and 
1929, mergers were occurring at a far more rapid pace than at the beginning of the decade or at 
any time during the more famous merger movement at the turn-of-the-century.58  Of the 8500 
acquisitions of formerly independent manufacturing and mining businesses between the end of 
World War I and the end of 1931, more than 4800 occurred between 1926 and 1930 and almost 
2300 disappeared in 1928 and 1929 alone.59
Economic concentration accompanied this revived period of merger and consolidation.  
Between 1922 and 1929, there were eight mergers valued at over $100 million and at least 
fourteen transactions in which the target corporation had assets valued at over $50 million.60  By 
1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means reported that “perhaps two-thirds of the industrial wealth 
of the country [has passed] from individual ownership to ownership by large, publicly-financed 
corporations.”61  In his famous dissent in the Louis K. Ligget case, Justice Brandeis described the 
extent of this economic concentration:  “200 nonbanking corporations, each with assets in excess 
of $90,000,000, control directly about one-fourth of all our national wealth.”62  One study 
concluded that "the merger movement of the 1920s not only significantly increased over-all levels 
of concentration but did so to a substantial extent" in certain key industry groups.63
After the stock market crash in October of 1929, there was a tendency to place at least 
part of the blame for the ensuing economic crisis on the “excessive” business combinations and 
resulting economic concentration of the 1920s.64  As Paul Conkin reports, this blame was 
probably misplaced.  “Numerous corporate consolidations increased efficiency even as they 
narrowed participation in key managerial choices.”65  The broad impact of the crash, however, 
made the reality irrelevant for a Congress seeking to blunt its bitter effects.  “The statutes which 
‘permitted necessary business adjustments’ in 1921” became from the post-Crash perspective of 
the 1930s, “one of the major and indispensable forces in the thrust towards economic 
concentration which characterized the ‘twenties.”66
Second, the liberalized reorganization provisions opened the door to reorganizations 
motivated primarily by a desire to reduce taxes.  This was primarily due to poor drafting – the 
reorganization provisions were overly detailed and yet still ambiguous in important ways.  
Although the Revenue Act of 1921 included what legislators thought to be “comprehensive” 
reorganization provisions, taxpayers soon took advantage of the many deficiencies and gaps in 
57 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. AND GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 206 n. 18 
(1932).
58 BUTTERS ET AL., supra note 41, at 292.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 294.
61 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 57, at vii.
62
 Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 566 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
63 BUTTERS ET AL., supra note 41, at 299 (citing industry groups such as oil, steel, and copper).
64
 Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 566-67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Other writers have shown that, coincident with 
the growth of these giant corporations, there has occurred a marked concentration of individual wealth; and that the 
resulting disparity in incomes is a major cause of the existing depression.”).
65 PAUL K. CONKIN, THE NEW DEAL 23 (2d ed. 1975).
66
 Sandberg, supra note 53, at 125.
(7/13/2004)             TAX, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND NORMS                  11
drafting.67  After extensive study, Congress concluded in 1924 that the relatively sparse 
reorganization provisions should be greatly expanded to specify the exact nature of each 
requirement for qualifying under the statute.68  The resulting revenue act was called one of “the 
most detailed and precise statutes which had been evolved up to that time.”69  Randolph Paul 
remarked that the reorganization provisions “on their face appeared sufficient to capture the most 
elusive quarry.”70
The detail of the reorganization provisions proved a mirage for those eager to stop abuse.  
Creative tax practitioners located loopholes in even the most explicit of clauses and openly 
devised transactions that complied with the letter if not the spirit of the statute.  One practitioner 
described the wide variety of reorganizations that were used to reduce taxable income:  “New 
corporations were established out of old with the assurance of larger deductions for depreciation; 
corporations on the verge of liquidation were reorganized so that earned surplus and surplus to be 
earned upon dissolution might be absorbed in larger issues of stock, and then dissolved without 
taxable profit except possibly to stockholders.  Elaborate projects were evolved whereby surplus 
cash was to be passed on to stockholders as a partial ‘liquidation’ of their shares.  Common law 
trusts were established by the score.”71  While the courts helped shut down a number of the 
schemes occasioned by loopholes and overly tight drafting,72 taxpayers won a fair number of the 
cases and even more probably went undetected.73
B. New Deal
1. Subcommittee Proposal
As Roosevelt settled into the presidency in 1933, Congress was in the process of 
investigating the causes of the stock market crash and Great Depression.  During the highly 
publicized Pecora hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,74 named after 
Ferdinand Pecora, the aggressive lead counsel for the Committee,75 there were allegations of 
67 PAUL, supra note 25, at 37.
68 See Id; Satterlee, supra note 25, at 640.
69 See Brookes, supra note 47, at 5.  An explanation of the proposed changes from the Revenue Act of 1921 consumed 
almost two full pages of the New York Times.  See Treasury Expert Explains Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1924, at 1, 8-
9.  Authored by A.W. Gregg, a special assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, the “Gregg Statement,” as it came to 
be known, became a symbol for a style of drafting that favored leaving nothing unsaid.  See Satterlee, supra note 25, at 
640.
70 PAUL, supra note 25, at 37.
71
 Kohler, supra note 31, at 180.  See Ernestine Breisch, Using the Stepped-Up Basis on Corporate Reorganizations, 9 
Tax Mag. 245 (1931) (describing the possibility of acquiring cost rather than carryover basis in a reorganization).
72 See Steven A. Bank, Federalizing the Tax-Free Merger:  Toward an End to the Anachronistic Reliance on State 
Corporation Laws, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1307, 1336-39 (1999) (describing cases) ("Federalizing the Tax-Free Merger").
73 See PAUL, supra note 25, at 37 (“defeat piled upon defeat” for Treasury).
74 See Stock Exchange Practices, Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. Res. 84, 73rd Cong., 
1st Sess. 2319-2325 (1933) (“Pecora Hearings”).
75 See The Man Who Will Question Morgan, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1933, § 8, at 2; ROE, supra note 6, at 110-11; LEFF, 
supra note 11, at 58-59.
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widespread misconduct and questionable actions by investment bankers and corporate managers.  
Some of these accusations related to the disabling of typical corporate governance mechanisms in 
connection with mergers and acquisitions.  In one device, the Pennsylvania Railroad financed a 
holding company by issuing “voting trust certificates” rather than stock so it could amass the 
financial resources to engage in strategic acquisitions of smaller railroad lines without being 
subject to stockholder oversight.76  An investment banker involved in organizing the 
Pennsylvania Railroad holding company candidly testified that all such efforts to deprive 
stockholders of control were “inventions of the devil.”77
Other corporate governance practices highlighted during the Pecora hearings related to 
the impropriety of executive compensation or dividend declarations.  With respect to the former 
issue, several Senators grilled Albert Wiggin, the former chairman of the board of directors at 
Chase National Bank, about the size and source of his income, noting that “[t]hey credited you 
with being responsible for some of their added  profits in the good years” by paying large 
bonuses, but “[i]n bad years [they failed to] charge you in any way with responsibility for 
losses.”78  As Wiggin later conceded under questioning, he alone determined his bonus and the 
board served as little more than a rubber stamp.79  With respect to the latter issue, Pecora 
questioned the director of Fox Film Corporation over its declaration of a $4 million dividend to 
its principal stockholder, the General Theaters Equipment, in a year when it sustained a loss of 
more than $5.5 million.80  Senator Couzens noted that this was particularly suspicious given the 
“very close affiliation between the General Theaters Equipment and the management of the Fox 
Film Corporation” and the fact that Fox was heavily in debt at the time.81  While it is not entirely 
clear that the practice in either case was improper, the investigation into these cases and other 
similar incidents indicated Congress’ heightened concern over the internal governance of the 
corporation.
This inquiry into Wall Street’s contribution to the stock market crash and the ensuing
Depression was accompanied by revelations of rampant tax evasion.  According to one account, 
not only had the world-renowned financier J.P. Morgan paid no income taxes during 1931 and 
1932, none of the partners in his investment house had either.82   While much of this was 
76 FERDINAND PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH 58-59 (1939).
77 Id. at 59 (quoting Otto Kahn, of Kuhn, Loeb and Company).  
78 See Pecora Hearings, supra note 74, at 2319-2325 (statement of Senator Adams).
79 Id. at 2337 (statement of Albert Wiggin) (“I think I made up that list with my name on it and the board always 
approved it.”).  When he later conceded that he had suggested his $100,000 retirement pay, “he unleashed a furious 
reaction from public and stockholder alike (which soon forced him to decline the pension).”  LEFF, supra note 11, at 84.
80 Pecora Hearings, supra note 74, at 3812 (questioning Hermann G. Place). Pecora raised the same issue in his 
questioning of John Stalker, the president of the Union Guard Trust Co., about the corporation’s decision to declare a 
dividend when it was not supported by earnings and when economic conditions did not justify it.  See id. at 4407.
81 Id. at 3813.  
82 LEFF, supra note 11, at 58-59; PECORA, supra note 76, at 190 (noting that Otto Kahn of Kuhn, Loeb also paid no 
income taxes during the years 1930, 1931, and 1932).
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perfectly legal,83 Congress was looking for scapegoats and the richer the better.  Thus, against the 
backdrop of an investigation that “had whipped up public outrage against corporate abuses,”84 the 
House authorized a thorough study of the internal revenue system in order to ferret out evasion 
and simplify the tax laws.85
The resulting House Subcommittee report issued in December of 1933 reflected these 
dual themes of tax avoidance and corporate excesses.86  At the press conference to announce the 
release of the Subcommittee report, the New York Times observed that the “[c]hanges sought are 
aimed principally at persons whose incomes are in the higher brackets as well as at corporations 
now legally permitted to take advantage of what committee members said were ‘unfair but legal’ 
provisions of the revenue laws.”87  One such apparently “unfair but legal” revenue law was the 
tax-free reorganization provisions.  In its report, the Subcommittee recommended eliminating the 
tax-free reorganization in order to “close the door to one of the most prevalent methods of tax 
avoidance.”88  Although nonrecognition treatment was premised on the principle that tax is 
deferred rather than exempted, the report noted that “the taxpayer is able to escape tax on these 
gains entirely by being permitted to elect the year in which he shall report such gain.”89
While the Subcommittee’s report prominently cited the tax avoidance rationale,90 it also 
disclosed an underlying corporate governance motivation for its recommendation.  In a separate 
memorandum attached to the report, the Subcommittee provided more detailed justification for 
repeal of the tax-free reorganization provisions.91  It acknowledged that one of the rationales for 
liberalizing the reorganization provisions during the early 1920s was to remove the obstacles to 
“normal business readjustments,” but concluded that this rationale was no longer salient.92  “[T]he 
present provisions,” the report observed, “have encouraged the injection into business structure of 
83 LEFF, supra note 11, at 59 (suggesting the tax consequences were the result of capital loss carryforwards); PECORA, 
supra note 76, at 192-93 (describing a common scheme where taxpayers would sell stocks with built-in losses to 
members of their own families and then buy them back after thirty days).
84 Id. at 85 (describing the outcry against excessive executive salaries).  According to Ellis Hawley, the hearings “began 
to familiarize the public with a variety of sensational abuses, with speculative pools, preferred lists, corporate 
pyramiding, insider deals, and numerous devices for unloading worthless securities upon unsuspecting purchasers.”  
ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY 306 (1966).
85
 H.R. Res. 183, 73d Cong., 77 CONG. REC. 5701 (1933).  See 78 CONG. REC. 2794 (1934) (statement of Rep. Welch) 
(“This bill (the House bill proposed as a result of the study of the internal revenue system) grew out of disclosures 
before the Senate Banking Committee by the money kings of America, that for years they had not contributed one 
dollar to the support of this Government.”).
86 SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73D CONG., 2D SESS., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON PREVENTION 
OF TAX AVOIDANCE (Comm. Print 1933) ("1933 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT").
87 Tax Plan Offered to Curb Evasions, Raise $237,000,000, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1933, at 1.
88
 1933 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 86.
89 Id.
90
 Indeed, it provided eight hypothetical cases in which the reorganization provisions were then used to avoid taxes.  
See id. at 39-42.
91 Id. at 37, exh. D (“Memorandum on Exchanges and Reorganizations”).
92 Id. at 38.  The rationale for the 1921 reforms has led at least one modern observer to conclude that the tax-free 
reorganization provisions are one “of the best examples of the Code’s attempt not to let tax rules influence corporate 
governance.” Paul B. Stephan, Disaggregation and Subchapter C:  Rethinking Corporate Tax Reform, 76 VA. L. REV. 
655, 677 (1990).  This analysis, however, ignores the corporate governance motivation for the later 1934 reforms. 
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an unsavory stimulus, such as the organization of large holding companies and the 
overcapitalization of business.”93  In effect, the Subcommittee report endorsed withdrawing the 
reorganization provisions as a means of stemming the tide of business combination and economic 
concentration.
The characterization of the reorganization provisions as an “unsavory stimulus” to the 
creation of holding companies was part of a general attack on such forms of corporate 
organization.  One of the Subcommittee’s many recommendations was to eliminate the provisions 
permitting an affiliated group of corporations to file a consolidated federal income tax return.94
As the report acknowledged,95 this was the culmination of a continuing controversy in Congress 
over consolidated returns and the dangers of holding companies.  Holding companies, or 
corporations whose assets consisted of the stock of subsidiary corporations, were often 
considered vehicles for the predatory activities of trusts and chain stores.96  In 1932, after 
rejecting a similar proposal to abolish the consolidated return,97 Congress levied a small tax on 
the privilege of filing as a consolidated group.98  According to the Subcommittee, however, this 
surcharge was no longer sufficient to offset the tax advantages provided to corporate families 
under the consolidated return provisions.  “In the past, when any corporation could carry forward 
a net loss from one year to another, the consolidated group did not have such a great advantage 
over the separate corporation.  Now that this net-loss carry-over has been denied, the advantage 
of the consolidated return is much greater on a comparative basis.”99  Thus, the Subcommittee 
proposal to eliminate the consolidated return, like the proposal to abolish the tax-free 
reorganization, was an attack on the holding company system.100
At the subsequent House Ways and Means Committee hearings, corporate managers 
opposed the Subcommittee’s recommendations,101 but they were noticeably muted in their 
reaction to the proposal to abolish the reorganization provisions.  James Emery of the National 
Association of Manufacturers generically pleaded “[w]e venture particularly at this time the 
suggestion that the national tax policy, for the most practical reasons, should encourage new 
investment rather than discourage it by radical change.  The development of new or the expansion 
of existing forms of business, means a new or enlarged contribution to the shrunken public 
93
 1933 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 86, at 39.  
94 Id. at 10.
95 Id.
96 See 75 CONG. REC. 7125 (1932) (statement of Rep. Cannon) (suggesting that the consolidated return allows holding 
companies to reduce prices and undercut the competition in one location while allowing the any tax losses suffered to 
be used to offset income from other more profitable locations).
97
 1933 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 86.
98 Id.  The National Industrial Recovery Act subsequently increased this rate.  Id.
99 Id.
100 Cf. Tax Bill Changes Offered by Borah, N.Y. TIMES, March 2, 1934, at 38 (characterizing Senator Borah’s attempt 
to revive the original Subcommittee consolidated return proposal in the Senate as an effort “to strike at the holding 
company system.”).
101 See generally Railroads Oppose Income Tax Change, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1933, at 5; Opposes Taxation as Social 
Cure-All, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1933, at 15.
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purse.”102  Although this statement could be construed as an indictment of the proposal to 
eliminate the tax-free reorganization provisions, Emery made no mention of this proposal.103
Only the United States Chamber of Commerce specifically opposed the proposal to eliminate the 
reorganization provisions.  It noted that “[e]xchanges, modifications of capital structure and 
consolidations undertaken in the interest of better operating conditions and as a means of 
expanding business activity should not be penalized but should be encouraged.  This is especially 
true at the present time when many reorganizations are unescapable as a result of the depression.  
Reorganizations which are necessary to business recovery and increased employment will not be 
undertaken if an immediate tax liability is imposed.”104  Even this expression of opposition, 
however, was a part of a prepared statement submitted in lieu of live testimony.105  No speaker 
actually devoted any of his allotted time to the reorganization proposal.106
Part of the silence on the reorganization provisions may have been due to the fact that 
Treasury was already doing most of the heavy labor in opposing the Subcommittee 
recommendations.107  Acting Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau issued a statement regarding 
the Subcommittee report at the start of the Ways and Means hearings.108  Morgenthau agreed with 
the Subcommittee that the reorganization provisions are both complex and “open to the serious 
objection of being overspecific,”109 but concluded that the provisions should be “completely 
redrafted” rather than abandoned entirely.110  Treasury believed that the elimination of the 
reorganization provisions would simply afford taxpayers an opportunity to claim losses, both 
immediately and over time in the former of higher bases for depreciation and depletion 
deductions, with the result that “the proposal would not only yield no additional revenue, but 
would result in a net loss.”111  While corporate managers did not reference the Treasury statement 
102 Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 215 (1933) (“1933 House Hearings”) (Statement 
of James A. Emery, Taxation Committee of the National Association of Manufacturers). 
103 Id.
104 Id. at 290-91 (statement of F.H. Clausen, Chairman of the Committee on Federal Taxation, Chamber of Commerce 
of the United States).
105 Id. at 287 (Chester Leasure appeared on behalf of the Chamber because Fred Clausen, the Chamber’s chief lobbyist 
on tax issues was unable to attend).  The written statement was subsequently republished in edited form in the New 
York Times.  See Opposes Taxation as Social Cure- All, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1933, at 15.
106
 Since witnesses had a limited time to speak before the committee, they presumably chose the most important issues 
to highlight during live testimony and reserved lesser issues for a written statement submitted sometime later.
107
 Treasury was apparently upset at its minimal role in the preparation of the Subcommittee report.  See LEFF, supra
note 11, at 61.
108 See STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY REGARDING THE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF A 
SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS RELATIVE TO METHODS OF PREVENTING THE AVOIDANCE AND 
EVASION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS TOGETHER WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVEMENT 
THEREOF, 73D CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm. Print 1933) (“STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY”).  See 
also Treasury Would Alter All Taxes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1933, at 1.
109 STATEMENT OF THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, supra note 108, at 9.
110 Id. at 9-10.
111 Id. at 10. This argument was not as persuasive after Congress adopted limits on the ability to recognize capital losses 
in the Revenue Act of 1934 and thereby greatly reduced the ability to use a taxable reorganization as an avenue for 
recognizing losses.  See Sandberg, supra note 53, at 121.
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in supporting their own testimony, it may have allowed them to focus on those recommendations 
Treasury did not choose to contest.
The problem with this explanation is that business leaders questioned a number of the 
Subcommittee recommendations that Treasury had already rejected in its own statement.  For 
instance, Treasury concluded that the Subcommittee proposal to abolish consolidated returns 
“might well be a backward step, which would result in little, if any, additional revenue.”112
According to Treasury, full recognition of intercompany transactions would be just as likely to 
result in deductible losses as gains and would incur considerable administrative expenses for both 
the government and the taxpayer.113  This strong repudiation of the Subcommittee 
recommendation, however, did not prevent a number of witnesses from raising the consolidated 
return issue in their own testimony.  The National Association of Manufacturers noted that the 
consolidated return “merely recognizes the separate corporate entities which are working parts of 
one business created for convenience and necessity, developed out of experience, and recognized 
by the States of the Union.”114  Similarly, M.L. Seidman of the New York Board of Trade 
protested that “[t]o shut one’s eyes to the position of a particular company in a group, and to 
insist that every corporation in that group file separate returns, would be to encourage artificial 
business arrangements and to distort normal and natural intercompany accounting methods.”115
2. House 
Despite the lack of public protest from business leaders and Subcommittee Chairman 
Hill’s confident predictions that its recommendations would prevail,116 the full House Ways and 
Means Committee sided with Treasury on the reorganization question.  In its report submitted in 
February of 1934, the Committee stated that “under present conditions, the wiser policy is to 
amend the provisions drastically to stop the known cases of tax avoidance, rather than to 
eliminate the sections completely.  This decision will further avoid the period of litigation and 
uncertainty which would necessarily follow a complete reversal of the established policy.”117
This apparent victory for corporate managers did not mean that the Committee sought to 
continue encouraging reorganizations.  In fact, under the Committee’s proposal, the number of 
transactions in which reorganization status was available would be severely limited to “(1) 
statutory mergers and consolidations; (2) transfers to a controlled corporation, ‘control’ being 
defined as an 80 per cent ownership; and (3) changes in the capital structure or form of 
112 Id. at 13.
113 Id.
114 1933 House Hearings, supra note 102, at 215 (statement of James A. Emery, Taxation Committee, National 
Association of Manufacturers).
115 Id. at 173 (statement of M.L. Seidman, New York Board of Trade).  See also id. at 290 (statement of F.H. Clausen, 
Chairman of the Committee on Taxation, Chamber of Commerce of the United States) (“Elimination of consolidated 
returns would undoubtedly force corporate mergers and consolidations solely for the purpose of avoiding an unfair tax.  
Mergers should be consummated only for the economic reason of increasing business efficiency.”).
116 Stands by Committee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1933, at 2.
117
 H.R. Rep. No. 73-704, at 13 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 564.
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organization.”118  According to its report, “the definition of reorganization has been restricted so 
that the definition will conform more closely to the general requirements of corporation law.”119
This admittedly “drastic” amendment to the reorganization provisions once again 
provoked little protest on the part of corporate managers.120  In the House, this was partly because 
the Ways and Means Committee pushed for the passage of a special rule prohibiting all 
amendments other than those offered by members of the Committee.121  According to 
Representative Robert Doughton, the Chair of the Committee, “[i]t is the only practical way to 
bring out the bill.  It is a good bill, and if it is opened to amendments it won’t be as good when 
passed as it now is.”122  The apparent rationale for the rule was to block any amendments seeking 
to scrap the whole income tax in favor of a sales tax,123 but the practical result was to secure 
passage of the bill with little debate on the floor of the House and shift protest on individual 
proposals to the Senate.124
3. Senate
Passage of the House bill did stir corporate managers to protest, but the protest was still 
relatively limited.  While the bill headed to the Senate Finance Committee, the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce once again issued a statement decrying the proposed changes, including those to the 
reorganization provision.  This statement, however, was only a slightly revised version of the one 
it submitted during the Ways and Means Committee hearings.  According to the Chamber, “[n]o 
tax should be imposed on exchanges or reorganizations unless there is a clearly realized gain.  
Reorganization and mergers made necessary, in view of economic conditions, as a matter of good 
business policy, should not be discouraged or precluded by additional taxation.”125  The Chamber 
allowed for some possibility of minor changes, but argued against anything more radical:  “The 
question of mergers and reorganizations in relation to Federal income taxes has always been a 
118 Id. at 14, reprinted in 1939 -1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 564.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 House Rule is Won to Speed Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1934, at 1.  See ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, 
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 356 (1940).
122 Id.
123 See $65,000,000 is Cut From New Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1934, at 7 (“Upon such procedure agreed upon 
[requesting a rule to limit amendments and debate], the only opportunity for a vote on a sales tax would be on a motion 
to send the whole bill back to the committee with instructions to insert the levy.  Since only one motion to recommit 
will be proposed in the rule, it is not a certainty that a vote will be afforded on the sales tax levy at all.”).  See 
Manufacturers Association Urges Sales Tax and Flexible Liquor Levy at House Hearing, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1933, 
at 1 (describing the growing impetus for a sales tax).
124
 The bill passed by a vote of 390 to 7.  78 CONG. REC. 3005 (1934).  See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 121, at 356 
(“There was less discussion of the fundamental income tax sections than on any similar occasion.  The few speeches 
made were in explanation of the changes.  Perhaps the amendments were of such technical nature that they were not 
readily understood.  Perhaps the members thought it futile to debate in view of the stress that had been placed on the 
profound study made by the subcommittee.  Certainly, after the passage of the gag rule, there was no point in offering 
amendments.”).
125 Tax Bill Attacked as Business Blow, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 1934, at 21.
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complex one.  The present provisions have been in the law practically unchanged since 1918 and 
taken as a whole are sound.  Any substantial change will result in confusion and uncertainty.”126
Corporate managers issued similar statements of opposition to the House bill’s proposed 
treatment of reorganization provisions during the Senate Finance Committee Hearings.  As in the 
House hearings, however, few witnesses addressed the issue and most of those who did only did 
so in their written statements.127  The one exception was David Gaskill on behalf of the Cleveland 
Chamber of Commerce.128  While he discussed a proposed limit on the deductibility of capital 
losses first,129 he did raise the reorganization provision in his testimony.  Gaskill stated that “[t]he 
bill, as passed by the House, took out the so-called ‘parenthetical clause’, and limits the definition 
to statutory mergers and consolidations.  We take the position that with that eliminated, the bill is 
now indefinite and a substantial amount of litigation will be necessary in order to find out just 
what is and what is not a statutory consolidation or merger.”130  As Senator Harrison appeared to 
recognize when he questioned Gaskill about his claims,131 and the Cleveland Chamber of 
Commerce implied in its written statement,132 the predicted litigation would most likely result 
from managers’ attempts to characterize stock and asset acquisitions – previously parenthetical 
clause transactions – as statutory mergers and consolidations.  
Aside from the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, no other party addressed the 
reorganization provision in their testimony.  The United States Chamber of Commerce submitted 
both a prepared brief and report in which the House’s reorganization provision was criticized, but 
much of this was essentially a repeat of the objections raised by the Cleveland Chamber of 
Commerce.  In its brief, the Chamber warned “[t]he provision affecting mergers or consolidations 
of corporations will result in confusion, and will discourage mergers which, in the view of recent 
economic conditions should be made in the interests of good business policies, and because of the 
lessened number of mergers, revenues will probably decrease.”133  Its accompanying report 
elaborated on such concerns, emphasizing the view that the House proposal would severely limit 
the tax-free reorganization:  “The apparent effect of this amendment will be to eliminate the most 
usual and important form of reorganization, leaving only comparatively restricted and technical 
forms permissible without tax.”134  According to the Chamber’s report, the cause of the confusion 
126 Id.
127
 As in the House, speakers were asked to limit their presentations and submit as much as possible in a written 
statement.  See Hearings on H.R. 7835 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 73d Cong. 1 (1934) (statement of Chairman 
Pat Harrison).  Thus, issues presented in live testimony were likely to be deemed more important than those only 
presented in a written statement.
128 Id. at 1 (statement of David A. Gaskill, Cleveland Chamber of Commerce).
129 Id. at 1-2.
130 Id. at 2-3.
131 Id. at 3 (Sen. Harrison).
132 See id. at 7 (arguing that “the changes proposed will prevent the consummation of transactions which are entirely 
proper and which are in fact necessary and advisable during a period of reconstruction.  The prevention of such 
transactions does not produce any revenue for the Government and creates unreasonable interference with the proper 
transaction of legitimate business.”). 
133 Id. at 50 (Brief of F.H. Clausen, Chairman of Special Committee on Federal Taxation, United States Chamber of 
Commerce).
134 Id. at 58 (Report of the Committee of Federal Taxation, Chamber of Commerce of the United States).
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would be that the meanings of the terms merger and consolidation would “have to be determined 
in various instances by the laws of the particular State which might be applicable in the case.  
What would be a merger or consolidation in one State might not be in another.  Instead, then, of 
having uniform principles generally applicable to all corporations, there would be different 
standards applicable to different corporations.”135
This latter argument proved to be convincing to the Senate Finance Committee – or at 
least it sounded reasonable enough to use as its official justification for the rejection of the 
House’s more radical amendments.  In its report, the Senate Finance Committee noted that it was 
“in complete agreement with the purposes of the House Bill,” but indicated that “some 
modifications are recommended in order to bring about a more uniform application of the 
provisions in all 48 of the States.  Not all of the States have adopted statutes providing for 
mergers or consolidations; and, moreover, a corporation of one State can not ordinarily merge 
with a corporation of another State.”136  Since “some legitimate and desirable business 
readjustments would be prevented” by limiting nonrecognition treatment to statutory mergers, the 
Finance Committee proposed a broader definition of “reorganization.”137  Thus, in addition to the 
statutory merger or consolidation and other transactions proposed under the House bill, the Senate 
Finance Committee proposed to include the following transaction within the definition of 
reorganization:  “the acquisition by one corporation in exchange solely for all or part of its voting 
stock:  of at least 80 per centum of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the total number 
of shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation; or of substantially all the properties 
of another corporation.”138  The Committee noted that “these transactions, when carried out as 
prescribed in this amendment, are in themselves sufficiently similar to mergers and 
consolidations as to be entitled to similar treatment.”139
The Senate Finance Committee proposal provided for a more expansive reorganization 
definition than the one passed by the House, but contemporary observers still thought it had been 
“sharply modified” from the existing provisions.140  As the Committee noted, it required the 
acquisition of 80% of the target corporation stock.141  Ever since the parenthetical clause was 
inserted into the reorganization provision in the 1921 Act, Congress had only required the 
acquisition of a majority of the target corporation stock.142  Moreover, both the asset and stock 
acquisitions would only be entitled to nonrecognition treatment if the property or stock were 
135 Id. at 59.  The Chamber further explained by providing an example:  “if two corporations owned by different 
interests desire to consolidate and give their stockholders no cash or property, but only stock representing the same 
properties, they may apparently do so free of tax if they happen both to be in the same State and that State provides by 
law for procedure which can be called a ‘merger or consolidation,’ but if not, and if the transaction involves one of the 
corporations or a new corporation taking over the stocks or properties then a tax is seemingly payable based upon 
appraised or estimated values of the stocks.”  Id. at 58-59.
136 S. REP. NO. 73-558, at 16 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2), at 586, 598 (“1934 Senate Report”).
137 Id. at 599.
138 Id. at 598.
139 Id. 
140
 Magill, supra note 49, at 639 n. 9.
141 Id.
142 See Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(c)(2), ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 230. 
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exchanged “solely for the voting stock of the acquiring corporation.”143  Not only had the former 
parenthetical clause not imposed a similar voting stock requirement, it had not specified the 
consideration at all.  One commentator called this “[p]erhaps the most radical change” to the 
reorganization provisions.144
Notwithstanding the significant changes to emerge from the Senate Finance Committee, 
corporate managers made no protest and the measure sailed through the Senate.145  Within a few 
weeks the House conferees accepted the Senate proposal on the reorganization provisions.  After 
little debate in either the House or the Senate over the Conference Report, the bill was signed into 
law in May of 1934.146  Not only did the Revenue Act of 1934, or more specifically its changes to 
the reorganization provision, provoke little opposition on the part of corporate managers,147 most 
of its major statutory innovations have endured to this day.148
II.      UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX
Just two years after the relatively mild reaction to a proposal to restrict a manager's ability to do a 
tax-free merger, there was a very different reaction to a proposal to limit their discretion over 
dividend policy.
A. Early history
Ever since an income tax was first imposed during the Civil War and Reconstruction, 
Congress has struggled with how to reach the undistributed profits of a corporation.  During the 
nineteenth century, undistributed profits were taxed as a way to ensure that corporations would 
not evade dividend taxes by simply accumulating, rather than distributing, their earnings.  Thus, 
in 1864, Congress used an undistributed profits tax as an enforcement mechanism for its taxation 
of the dividends issued by corporations in certain industries.149  The House revived the 
undistributed profits tax in 1894 when it passed a bill imposing a dividends tax.150  Such efforts 
143
 1934 Senate Report, supra note 131, at 599.
144 ROBERT S. HOLZMAN, CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS:  THEIR FEDERAL TAX STATUS 66 (1948).
145
 78 CONG. REC. 6574 (1934) (53 to 7 with 36 not voting).
146 See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 121, at 362.
147 See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680.  This is not to say that corporate managers expressed no displeasure 
about other aspects of the bill.  See LEFF, supra note 11, at 66 (noting that one of the chief lobbyists for the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce described the Act as an “ill-considered modified program.”).
148
 See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(1)(A) (statutory merger requirement) & (a)(1)(B) & (C) (solely for voting stock requirements).  
See also Bank, Federalizing the Tax-Free Merger, supra note 72, at 1307 (discussing the history of the statutory 
merger requirement).
149 See Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 120-22, 13 Stat. 223, 283-85 (The 1864 Act taxed businesses in certain 
specified industries such as transportation, insurance and banking on dividends or interest paid, and on “undistributed 
sums, or sums made or added during the year to their surplus or contingent funds.”).
150
 Section 59 of the House Bill provided, in relevant part, 
[t]hat there shall be levied and collected a tax of 2 per cent on all dividends in scrip or money thereafter 
declared due, wherever and whenever the same be declared payable to stockholders, policy holders, or 
depositors or parties whatsoever, including nonresidents, whether citizens or aliens, as part of the earnings, 
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were not controversial, however, because the norm was for corporations to distribute virtually all 
of their profits as dividends.151
After passage of the Sixteenth Amendment,152 Congress once again employed the 
undistributed profits tax concept, but only as a penalty provision.  Under the Tariff Act of 
1913,153 shareholders were subject to a tax on their undistributed profits when the corporation was 
found to have unreasonably accumulated profits for the purpose of evading the high surtax rates 
on individual income.154  This pass-through undistributed profits tax remained in place until it 
was deemed to be unconstitutional under the realization requirement announced in Eisner v. 
Macomber.155  In subsequent years, the undistributed profits tax was applied directly to the 
corporation when the purpose of the accumulation was to evade the surtaxes on individual income 
or when the corporation was formed for the purpose of evading the surtaxes.156  Because of the 
tax’s intent requirement, however, the provision was often not enforced during the early years of 
the income tax.157
Perhaps recognizing the inherent problems with the use of the undistributed profits tax as 
a penalty provision, various individuals and groups forwarded proposals to broaden the tax’s 
scope.  In 1917, Senator Andrieus Jones of New Mexico proposed to tax corporations on a certain 
percentage of their undistributed profits regardless of the purpose for the retention.158  While a 
bill introduced by the Senate Finance Committee to adopt this proposal was rejected, the Senate 
eventually adopted something similar to Jones’ original suggestion in an amendment to the 
Revenue Act of 1924 before it was removed in the House.159  In 1928, the Joint Committee on 
Internal Revenue Taxation revived the undistributed profits tax proposal, but Congress rejected it 
amid concerns about making such a radical change during a period of business expansion.160
income or gains of any bank, trust company, savings institution, and of any fire, marine, life, inland insurance 
company, either stock or mutual, under whatever name or style known or called in the United States or 
Territories, whether specially incorporated or existing under general laws, and on all undistributed sums, or 
sums made or added during the year to their surplus or contingent funds.”
26 Cong. Rec. 6831 (1894).  As passed, the 1894 Act taxed corporations directly, but the Supreme Court struck down 
the income tax as an unconstitutional direct tax and therefore the corporate tax was never implemented.  Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 572 (1895).
151 See Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
447, 528-29 (2001).
152 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
153
 Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
154
 Id. at § II(A) 2, 38 Stat. at 166-67.  At the time, all individual income was subject to a flat normal tax, but incomes 
above a certain level were subject to an additional surtax at gradually increasing rates.
155
 252 U.S. 189 (1920).  Prior to this case, Congress merely repeated the 1913 provision in subsequent revenue acts.  
See Revenue Act of 1916, § 3, 39 Stat. 758; War Revenue Act of 1917, § 3, 40 Stat. 301; Revenue Act of 1918, § 220, 
40 Stat. 1072. 
156 See John B. Martin, Jr., Taxation of Undistributed Corporate Profits, 35 MICH. L. REV. 44, 49 (1936).
157 See WALTER LAMBERT, THE NEW DEAL REVENUE ACTS:  THE POLITICS OF TAXATION 273 (1970).
158 See Martin, supra note 156, at 44; LAMBERT, supra note 157, at 274.
159 LAMBERT, supra note 157, at 274; Note, The Surtax on Undistributed Profits, 50 HARV. L. REV. 332, 332 n. 2 
(1936).
160 BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 121, at 405; LAMBERT, supra note 157, at 274.
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B. Revenue Act of 1936
1. Prelude to an undistributed profits tax
Even before he was elected for the first time in 1932, President Roosevelt’s advisors had 
urged him to consider the possibility of an undistributed profits tax.  As he was campaigning for 
the presidency, Roosevelt’s small circle of policy advisors – the “Brain Trust” as they came to be 
called – were hard at work developing methods of stabilizing the economy and preventing a 
repeat of the 1929 stock market crash.161  In a memorandum to then-Governor Roosevelt, the 
Brain Trusters outlined what would become the foundation for the New Deal.162  Although the 
memorandum identified many culprits for the depression, it laid much of the blame on the 
unreasonable accumulation of corporate profits.  According to the memorandum, the prosperity of 
the Twenties led to “a greater accumulation of surpluses than were ever before realized in 
economic history.”163 This practice of “corporate hoarding,” the memorandum charged, “upset 
the balance of production and consumption” and contributed both to the crash and the ensuing 
Depression.164  Roosevelt’s advisors recommended a “tax on undistributed surplus income of 
corporations” as a means of “forcing undistributed surplus into the general market for capital.”165
While Roosevelt clearly endorsed the basic principles underlying the recommendation,166
he did not push for the enactment of an undistributed profits tax until two events prompted a 
budgetary crisis arose at the end of his first term of office.  First, the Supreme Court struck down 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act and consequently invalidated the processing taxes Roosevelt had 
counted on to finance the Act’s operations.167  Second, Congress overrode a presidential veto to 
161 See DANIEL R. FUSFELD, THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW DEAL
207 (1954); RAYMOND MOLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS 21-22 (1939).
162
 Memorandum of May 19, 1932 of Raymond Moley and others for Franklin Delano Roosevelt outlining national 
program for recovery in Box 282, Folder 3, Raymond Moley Papers, Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford 
University (“Memorandum of May 19, 1932”).  The May 19 memorandum was written in response to a request by 
Roosevelt to keep him updated during his pre-campaign vacation trip to Warm Springs.  It became the opportunity to 
prepare a series of specific recommendations for various aspects of the economic crisis and was the foundation of many 
of Roosevelt’s campaign speeches and eventually his acceptance speech.  See Moley, supra note 156, at 21-22; Fusfeld, 
supra note 161, at 219.  Many, if not most, of the memorandum’s recommendations were eventually enacted into law.
163
 Memorandum of May 19, 1932, supra note 162, at 1.
164 Id. at 2-3.
165 Id. at 3-4.
166
 In his July 1932 acceptance speech at the Democratic national convention in Chicago, for example, he attributed the 
Depression to heavy “corporate surpluses” used to finance “unnecessary plants” and rampant pre-crash stock market 
speculation.  July 2, 1932 Speech in I THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 651 (Samuel I. 
Rosenman, ed. 1932).  He did not even suggest the possibility of enacting the specific proposal, however, until later in 
his term.  In his message to Congress on June 19, 1935, Roosevelt declared that ultimately we might need to use 
taxation to “discourage unwieldy and unnecessary corporate surpluses.”  ALFRED G. BUEHLER, THE UNDISTRIBUTED 
PROFITS TAX 19 (1937).
167 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).  Under the Act, the Secretary of Agriculture was empowered to pay 
farmers not to produce a particular commodity when prices for that commodity fell to dangerously low levels.  Id. at 
88-90.
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accelerate payment on World War I veterans’ bonuses from 1945 to 1936.168  The combined 
result of these two events was a $620 million shortfall in the president’s budget.169  To address 
this shortfall, Roosevelt and his advisors once again turned to the undistributed profits tax.170
On March 3, Roosevelt addressed Congress in a supplemental budget message.171
Ostensibly, the message was merely to announce the need for an additional $620 million in 
revenue to replace the processing taxes and fund the veterans’ bonuses.  Roosevelt made a point 
of acknowledging Congress’ discretion to determine the appropriate means to raise such 
revenue.172  His true aim, however, was to push his proposal for an undistributed profits tax.173  In 
advocating for the undistributed profits tax, Roosevelt did not mention its potential as a check on 
corporate managers and a stimulus to the economy.  Roosevelt instead emphasized its two more 
politically saleable features:174  (1) its ability to equalize the treatment of all business owners, and 
(2) its promise to “stop ‘leaks’ in present surtaxes.”175  One particular novel aspect of Roosevelt’s 
proposal was that it was designed not to serve as it had in the past as a penalty tax, but rather as a 
replacement for the corporate income tax.176  Distributed income would be subject to one layer of 
tax while retained income would bear both a corporate and shareholder-level tax.
Unlike the proposal to abolish the reorganization provisions in 1934, the undistributed 
profits tax proposal aroused “deep opposition” on the part of corporate managers.177  Alfred 
Buehler reported, “[t]he business world . . . was aghast at the proposal and shuddered at the 
consequences if it were adopted.”178  Under then-prevailing dividend practices, the tax could not 
possibly raise the required $620 million in revenue.179  Thus, the rates would have to be set high 
enough to “compel[] corporations radically to alter their present dividend policy” in order to 
reach its revenue goals.180  This would force many corporations to rely more heavily on expensive 
and intrusive external financing sources, something managers are generally disinclined to do 
168 See LEFF, supra note 11, at 170.  Although this meant an immediate cash payment of almost $2 billion, the real cost 
of this payment was the $120 million annual carrying charge on financing the bonuses.  Id.
169 See BLAKEY & BLAKEY, supra note 121, at 401; SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 472 
(photo reprint 1980) (1967).
170 See JOHN MORTON BLUM, FROM THE MORGENTHAU DIARIES:  YEARS OF CRISIS, 1928-1938 306 (1959).
171 See A Supplemental Budget Message to Congress (March 3, 1936) in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 102 (Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., 1938).
172 Id. at 104-05 (“I leave, of course, to the discretion of the Congress the formulation of the appropriate taxes for the 
needed permanent revenue.”).
173 Id. at 105.
174 See LEFF, supra note 11, at 175-77.
175 A Supplemental Budget Message to Congress (March 3, 1936) in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 171, at 105.
176 Id. at 106 (Roosevelt stated the undistributed profits tax would accomplish its goals only “if accompanied by a 
repeal of the present corporate income tax, the capital stock tax, the related excess profits tax and the present exemption 
of dividends from the normal tax on individual income.”).
177
 Arthur Krock, Opposition is Divided Over President’s Tax Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 1936, at 20.
178 BUEHLER, supra note 166, at 23.
179 See The New Tax Schedule, N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 1936, at 20.
180 Id.
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especially when the alternative is simply to dip into retained earnings.181  Managers were perhaps 
most offended by the fact that a forced change in dividend policy would substitute “the blanket 
judgment of Congress and the Treasury Department, based on a general theory” for the 
“individual judgment of business managers, based on their direct knowledge of the needs of their 
particular company.”182
2. House 
Corporate managers were initially restrained in their public responses to the President’s 
message,183 but this quickly changed as the undistributed profits tax concept was transformed into 
a concrete proposal.  Under the bill as it was presented to the House Ways and Means Committee, 
the corporate income tax would be replaced by an undistributed profits tax graduated according to 
the percentage of net income retained.184  For corporations with annual net income of $10,000 or 
less, the rates ranged from 1% on the first 10% of undistributed net income to 29.7% on 
undistributed net income of 70.3% or more.185  For corporations with annual income in excess of 
$10,000, the bill proposed rates ranging from 4% on the first 10% of undistributed net income to 
a maximum of 42.5% on undistributed net income of 57.5% or more.186  “Undistributed net 
income” was defined to include adjusted net income less taxable dividends and the undistributed 
profits tax itself.187  The bill exempted or provided special treatment for banks, insurance 
companies, corporations in receivership, foreign corporations and corporations that were 
contractually or legally prohibited from paying dividends.188  Finally, the bill subjected dividends 
to the normal tax on individuals.189
Despite Internal Revenue Commissioner Guy Helvering’s declaration that “[t]here is no 
intention or desire whatever to interfere with the internal management of business enterprises,”190
corporate managers showed up in force at the Ways and Means hearings to testify against the 
181 See Jensen, supra note 19, at 323 (“Financing projects internally avoids this monitoring and the possibility the funds 
will be unavailable or available only at high explicit prices.”).
182 Punishing Prudence, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 1936, at 22.
183 See George B. Bryant, Jr., Reform Motive in Tax Program, BARRON’S, March 30, 1936, at 13 (“The remarkable lack 
of visible opposition to the proposal to date can be explained easily.  It does not necessarily mean that business and 
industry will accept it without question and opposition.  The scheme, thus far, has been in a purely formulative stage, 
and its effects upon the interests most vitally concerned cannot be definitely appraised.”); Trade Groups Study Tax 
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 1936, at 30 (“Organized business groups are reserving any public criticism of the 
President’s plan for taxing corporate surpluses until later, it developed in a canvas of association offices yesterday. . . . 
Advices received by some of the associations from Washington offices are to the effect that opposition to the measure 
will develop within the coming ten days.”). 
184 Revenue Act of 1936:  Hearings on H.R. 12395 Before the Sen. Comm. on Fin., 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1936) (“1936 
House Hearings”).  
185 Id. at 5-6.
186 Id. at 6.
187 Id. at 5.
188 Id. at 6-11.
189 Id. at 9.
190 Id. at 22.
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proposal.  Unlike in 1934, however, the large trade associations presented oral testimony against 
the undistributed profits tax rather than reserving the issue for their written statements.191
Moreover, these trade groups often sent multiple representatives to testify against different 
aspects of the proposal.  Three speakers, for example, represented the United States Chamber of 
Commerce, with their combined testimony consuming more than seventy-five pages of the 
transcribed hearings.192
Not only did the national trade associations devote a substantial portion of their allotted 
time to the undistributed profits tax proposal, they were harsh in their criticism.  Noel Sargent, 
secretary of the National Association of Manufacturers, argued that the retention of corporate 
profits produced benefits ranging from an increase in stockholder value and industrial 
employment from the expansion of plant operations to the preservation of working capital and the 
protection against depression.193  Fred Clausen of the United States Chamber of Commerce was 
even more candid in his opposition, warning that “[t]his proposal would cause corporate 
management to be controlled, in its decisions on fiscal policy, by fear of government exactions 
rather than by good business judgment.”194  Clausen predicted that the tax “would engender such 
uncertainties concerning the sound course to pursue as to subject the management to grave 
difficulties with shareholders and creditors. . . . You can well imagine the difficulties facing 
management and the board of directors in a company as to how to meet a situation which would 
exist if this proposal becomes the law of the land.”195  According to Clausen, “[i]t presents the 
danger that corporate management would be subject to serious criticism and even law suits if 
liberal dividend policies were followed to escape taxes and gave rise to charges of dissipation of 
assets.”196
Many smaller national, regional, and local trade groups joined the National Association 
of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in testifying against the tax.  The chairman 
of the tax committee of the Illinois Manufacturing Association warned of the “grave danger that 
the present highly capitalized organizations will have a continuing advantage over these small 
corporations” by virtue of the imposition of the tax.197  R.C. Fulbright of the Southern Pine 
Association echoed this charge, stating that “[w]e consider that it would be a very great detriment 
to our smaller companies unless some what can be found to protect the company that is heavily 
indebted or the company that must in order to keep going make needed improvements.”198  As a 
191
 This was in part due to the fact that the 1936 hearings were primarily devoted to the undistributed profits tax issue 
and therefore the trade groups did not have to pick and choose among the issues.  Nevertheless, corporate managers 
thought it was important to testify in person against the proposed undistributed profits tax rather than send in written 
statements. 
192 See id. at 735 (Fred Clausen); id. at 760 (Roy Osgood); id. at 803 (E.C. Alvord). 
193 1936 House Hearings, supra note 184, at 203, 206-210 (statement of Noel Sargent, Secretary, National Association 
of Manufacturers).
194 Id. at 737 (statement of Fred H. Clausen, Chairman of the Committee on Federal Finance, Chamber of Commerce of 
the United States).
195 Id. at 739-40.
196 Id. at 740.
197 Id. at 352 (statement of G.L. Walters, Secretary, Illinois Association of Manufacturers).
198 Id. at 468 (statement of R.C. Fulbright, Southern Pine Association).
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representative of the Detroit Board of Commerce summarized, “a tried system of taxation is much 
better than a new system of taxation.”’199
Perhaps more significant than the trade association testimony was that, unlike in 1934, 
business was not content to let its representatives speak for it.  A parade of individual 
businessmen appeared before the Ways and Means Committee to testify against the tax.  Some of 
these witnesses were from small businesses that felt threatened by the tax.  The president of a 
bridge corporation testified “[t]he smaller companies have only grown by using their earned 
surplus in the building of larger facilities and in increasing their working capital the necessary 
amount to take care of the increased capacity.”200  Not only were such companies concerned 
about their ability to grow, they argued that the tax would prevent them from repaying their 
existing bank indebtedness.201  Other witnesses appeared to represent the concerns of larger 
companies.  One attorney noted that “[s]ince 70 percent of the earnings of [publicly owned 
companies] are distributed without regard to the tax brackets of the stockholders, and since the 
earnings of [privately owned companies] are distributed only after careful consideration of the tax 
brackets of its stockholders,” the committee should distinguish between public and private 
corporations in applying the tax.202
During their testimony, Treasury representatives attempted to allay corporate managers’ 
fears.203  First, they pointed out that the tax would still permit accumulation of a fairly significant 
surplus.204  According to Oliphant, corporations might be able to retain 20% and 30% of their 
earnings under the proposal.205  Second, Treasury officials suggested corporations could satisfy 
their capital needs through debt and equity financing, or, where those methods were 
199 Id. at 841 (statement of Raymond H. Berry, Detroit Board of Commerce).  See id. at 857 (“The radical change in 
form of taxation suggested, and the serious effect of the proposed system on recovery and employment, prompts us to 
urge your committee to explore the effects and results with great care, giving full consideration to both practice and 
theory.”) (statement of John W. O’Leary, President, Machinery and Allied Products Institute).
200 Id. at 146 (statement of Clyde G. Conley, President, Mount Vernon Bridge Co.).
201 See id. at 177 (statement of Dean Alfange, general counsel, Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co.) (“Under the tax 
recommended by the committee, corporations financed by banks and those that have weathered the depression by 
means of bank loans would be severely penalize [sic] in applying their earnings to the liquidation of these loans.”).
202 Id. at 92 (statement of Albert Hubschman, Hubschman & Walsh).
203 Id. at 607 (statement of Herman Oliphant, General Counsel, Treasury Department).  Herman Oliphant emphasized 
that “it is not for anybody in Washington to tell business executives how much of their earnings they shall keep back 
and how much they shall distribute.  That is not the Government’s business. . . . But it is the Government’s business to 
see to it that those administering the affairs of a corporation shall not use it, nor permit it to be used for avoiding the 
surtaxes which everybody else has to pay.  That is what this does.”  The New York Times was clearly dubious of 
Oliphant’s statement, asking “[i]f the proposed tax is not a tax designed to control the dividend policy of corporations, 
one would like to know what it is. . . . Mr. Oliphant is saying to the corporations in effect:  ‘We are not trying in the 
slightest to influence your dividend policy, but we will put a thumping tax on you if you don’t pay out everything, and 
let you off scot free from taxes if you do.’”  Editorial, The Ship and the Rats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1936, at 22.
204 Id. at 581 (statement of Arthur H. Kent, Acting Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue) (it “is continually 
overlooked that the measure will permit retention of a substantial fraction . . . without a corporate tax burden equal to or 
in excess of the burden imposed by the present law.”).
205 Id. at 649 (statement of Herman Oliphant, General Counsel, Treasury Department).  See also id. at 582 (Kent 
estimated that a corporation might be able to retain as a high as 40% of earnings without exceeding its previous income 
tax liability).
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unavailable,206 by retaining funds through the issuance of taxable stock dividends.207  Recent 
judicial decisions had confirmed the possibility that a corporation could issue a type of stock 
dividend that would be considered taxable to the stockholder, but would permit the corporation to 
retain the underlying funds.208
Treasury’s responses appeared sufficient to satisfy any lingering concerns on the part of 
most Committee members.  Despite opponents’ urgings to proceed slowly before pursuing such a 
“radical change” in the system of taxing corporate income,209 the undistributed profits tax 
emerged from the Committee and quickly passed in the House with surprisingly little dissent.210
Much of this apparent lack of interest was due to the Republicans’ decision to avoid prolonging 
consideration of an issue that was likely to face stiffer opposition in the Senate.211
3. Senate 
Although opponents were initially emboldened by reports that even pro-Administration 
members of the Senate Finance Committee were dissatisfied with the House bill,212 the 
overwhelming approval of the bill in the House caused such optimism to waver.213  Thus, even 
before the Senate Finance Committee began hearings on the proposed undistributed profits tax, 
corporate managers and their representatives redoubled their efforts to oppose the bill.  The 
Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York issued a report sharply condemning the tax:  “In 
practice this proposed tax involves serious Federal interference with business management.  It is a 
scheme to force the distribution of corporate profits regardless of the policy dictated by sound 
206 See, e.g., id. at 761 (statement of Roy Osgood, U.S. Chamber of Commerce) (suggesting that small corporations 
lacked access to the debt and equity markets).
207 Id. at 582. 
208 Id. at 593.  In 1935, for instance, the Sixth Circuit held that a dividend of common stock to preferred stockholders 
constituted a taxable stock dividend because it meaningfully changed the preferred stockholders’ interest in the 
corporation.  See Commissioner v. Tillotson Mfg. Co., 76 F.2d 189, 190 (6th Cir. 1935).
209 Id. at 857 (statement of John W. O’Leary, President, Machinery and Allied Products Institute).  See also id. at 841 
(statement of Raymond H. Berry, Detroit Board of Commerce) (“I believe a tried system of taxation is much better than 
a new system of taxation, which to me presents many difficulties.”).
210 See $803,000,000 Tax Bill Wins by Vote of 267-93 in House; Business Attacks New Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 
1936, at 1; see House Gets New Tax Bill, But Yield is Still in Doubt; Quick Passage Forecast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 
1936, at 1 (House Ways and Means Committee voted 15 to 8 in favor of reporting the bill to the full House). At times, 
fewer than 10% of the Representatives were present for the debates over the bill, and, according to the New York Times, 
“not more than half [of those present] were listening to the discussion.” Turner Catledge, Democrat Lines up with Tax 
Bill Foes in Attack in House, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1936, at 1, 4; 80 CONG. REC. 6009 (statement of Rep. Rich).
211 See Republicans Bar Tax Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1936, at 12.
212 See Alfred F. Flynn, Finance Committee Questions Tax Bill on Two Grounds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1936, at 1.
213 See George B. Bryant, Jr., Tax Bill Speeded as Opposition Wanes in Senate, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1936, at 1, 1-7; 
Turner Catledge, $803,000,000 Tax Bill Wins By Vote of 267-93 in House; Business Attacks New Deal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 1936, at 1 (“Because of the tremendous House majority in today’s vote and the ease with which the bill was 
shoved through the amending stages in that body yesterday, prospective opposition in the Senate was felt to be cooling 
perceptibly.  Republican senators indicated they might follow the lead of their House colleagues and merely make their 
record against the whole new tax proposal, without attempting to amend it.”).
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business judgment.”214  Similarly strong statements emerged from the annual meeting of the 
United States Chamber of Commerce, where it adopted a resolution decrying the undistributed 
profits tax as an attempt “to regulate the management of corporations.”215
Once the Senate Finance Committee hearings began, business leaders appeared in even 
greater numbers than during the House Ways and Means Committee hearings to testify against 
the undistributed profits tax.  Whereas fifty-one non-governmental speakers testified on the bill 
during the House hearings, nearly double that number – ninety-four – testified before the Senate 
Finance Committee.216  The Senate Finance Committee also received letters from another forty-
three individuals or organizations, while the House Ways and Means Committee received only 
fourteen such written statements or letters.217  Some of the increase in the number of people 
testifying on the bill was attributable to the Senate’s consideration of a proposal to impose a new 
processing tax.218  Nevertheless, the primary topic for most witnesses was the undistributed 
profits tax.  Although they advocated relegating the tax to a subordinate role if Congress insisted 
on adopting it,219 they maintained a steadfast opposition to the entire concept.  The principal 
complaint was that the tax would interfere with normal business operations.  Managers’ concerns 
ranged from the specific concern that the tax would upset the “regularity of dividend” to the more 
general worry “over the uncertainty produced by the constant changing of our tax laws.”220  The 
United States Chamber of Commerce summarized such complaints:
The plan would tend to provide substitution of public control for private 
management in important fiscal operations of business.  It would promote improvident 
and unstable dividend policies in many companies.  In others it would engender such 
uncertainties concerning the sound course to pursue as to subject the management to 
grave difficulties with shareholders and creditors.  It presents the danger that corporate 
214 New Tax Law Unsound Says the Chamber, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1936, at 37.  See Chamber Attacks Tax Bill, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 28, 1936, at 1.
215
 Thrust at Tax Bill Winds up Chamber, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1936, at 1.  The Chamber’s annual meeting was widely 
covered in the press and its rhetoric was portrayed as a symbol of business’ growing distrust of the New Deal.  See 
Wide Rift Shown Between Business and New Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 1936, at 2; Chamber Talks Caustic, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 30, 1936, at 1; Chamber Speakers Assail Profits Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1936, at 10; Felix Belair, Jr., 
Business and the New Deal Still Far Apart, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1936, § 4, at 3.
216 Compare 1936 House Hearings, supra note 184, at III-IV (index of statements) with Revenue Act, 1936:  Hearings 
on H.R. 12395 Before the Sen. Comm. on Fin., 74th Cong., 2d Sess. III-VI (1936) (“1936 Senate Hearings”). 
217 Compare 1936 House Hearings, supra note 184, at IV with 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 216, at V-VI.
218 See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 216, at 3 (statement of Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury) (urging 
consideration of the President’s proposed new processing tax, which was not considered by the House, to replace the 
one struck down by the Court).
219
 One particularly effective argument in this respect was to question the tax’s ability to raise the necessary revenue by 
itself.  See 1936 Senate Hearings, supra note 216, at 682 (statement of James A. Emery, general counsel, National 
Association of Manufacturers) (“it is not . . . a reliable source of revenue, for it is subject to the variations of business 
policy rather than the net income of the business itself”).  See also id. at 220, 221 (statement of Fred H. Clausen, United 
States Chamber of Commerce) (“The added revenue to be derived is highly uncertain and insufficient.  It is less than 
the budgeted increase in ordinary expenditures for the next fiscal year.”).
220 Id. at 75 (statement of Franklin Spencer Edmonds, Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce); 101 (Statement of M.L. 
Seidman, New York Board of Trade).  See also id. at 143 (statement of Paul H. Wilson, Graton & Knight Co.) 
(concerned about replacing a system we have had for many years for one “that we do not know what it will produce). 
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management would be subject to serious criticism and even lawsuits if liberal dividend 
policies, followed to escape taxes, give rise to charges of dissipation of assets.221
The constant themes running throughout managers’ testimony was that the tax constituted an 
unwarranted interference with their ability to run the corporation.
Not only were there more people protesting the undistributed profits tax bill, they were 
more direct in complaining about the potential interference with corporate management.  Noel 
Sargent of the National Association of Manufacturers warned that “[a]ny attempt to substitute the 
judgment of commissions or legislators for that of industrial executives as to the percentage of 
earnings which can be properly distributed as dividends is economically unsound and fraught 
with dangers alike to employers, stockholders, and the public.”222  Herman Lind of the National 
Machine-Tool Builders Association echoed such concerns, suggesting that the 
management/shareholder and other conflicts engendered by the tax “will deflect the energies of 
management from the aggressive production and sale of goods and services which are its main 
function, to attempts to cope with a tangled mass of administration problems and 
uncertainties.”223
Although managers preferred to cut the undistributed profits tax out of the bill entirely, 
they tried to influence the Finance Committee’s consideration of several compromise proposals.  
In one prepared with the substantial assistance of the United States Chamber of Commerce, the 
undistributed profits tax would become a mere temporary supplement to the corporate income 
tax.224  In another, the undistributed profits tax rate would be set at exactly same rate as the 
normal tax on dividends, thereby effectively nullifying its effect on dividend policy.225  When the 
Senate Finance Committee Chair, Pat Harrison, proposed a modest three percent spread between 
the normal (4%) and undistributed profits tax (7%) rates, corporate managers howled,226 but it 
was eventually adopted by both the Committee and the full Senate.227
As the bill proceeded to a conference committee to resolve the differences between the 
radically different House and Senate versions, corporate managers took their case to shareholders 
221 Id. at 225 (statement of Fred H. Clausen, United States Chamber of Commerce).
222 Id. at 651 (statement of Noel Sargent, National Association of Manufacturers).
223 Id. at 520 (statement of Herman H. Lind, General Manager, National Machine-Tool Builders Association).  See id. 
at 724 (statement of H.W. Story, Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co.) (“But with the normal pressure upon management 
by stockholders for the payment of larger dividends, it would become more difficult for management to pursue a 
conservative policy of utilizing a large proportion of it earnings for the purpose of promoting the growth of the 
company.”).
224 Senate Group Plans Complete Tax Bill Revision, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1936, at 2.  Under this proposal, the corporate 
income tax would be retained at rates ranging from 17.5% to 20% and dividends would be subject to the normal tax, 
but the undistributed profits tax would remain a part of the bill for only three years.  Id.
225 See Editorial, A Compromise Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1936, at 18.
226
 The United States Chamber of Commerce issued a statement denouncing Harrison’s compromise.  See Turner 
Catledge, New Tax Program is Held Adequate by the Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1936, at 1 According to the 
Chamber, “[t]he introduction of that principle [the undistributed profits tax] into our tax system in any form whatever is 
opposed by business on the justifiable ground, among others, that it would inject government into the management of 
private enterprise.”  Id. at 27.
227
 Turner Catledge, 18% Corporate Income Tax and 7% on Undivided Profit Agreed on by Senate Group, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 22, 1936, at 1; Tax Bill is Passed by Senate, 38 to 24; Conference to Act, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1936, at 1.
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directly and to the public at large.  The president of General Motors, Alfred Sloan, sent a letter to 
shareholders with the regular quarterly dividend in which he warned that it “would be little short 
of a catastrophe” for the government to interfere with “the employment of accumulated profits by 
aggressive and intelligent management.”228  The National Association of Manufacturers issued a 
statement declaring that 
[b]oth the Senate Finance Committee and House bills accept the principle of taxation of 
undistributed profits.  Such a proposal is economically unsound, since it repudiates the 
policy of industrial reinvestment of earnings upon which expansion and employment 
have been based for over 100 years, and because it seeks to substitute government 
judgment as to the desirable amount of corporate reserves for that of directors elected by 
corporate stockholders.229
Managers hoped that these public relations efforts would pressure Congress to abandon the 
undistributed profits tax entirely, but they ultimately proved unsuccessful.  The conference 
committee successfully pushed through a compromise proposal.  Thus, under the Revenue Act of 
1936, Congress retained the corporate income tax, subjected dividends to the normal tax, and 
imposed an undistributed profits tax at rates ranging from 7% to 27%.230
C. The campaign to repeal the tax in the Revenue Act of 1938
1. Aftermath of the 1936 Act
In the immediate aftermath of the passage of the 1936 Act, business opposition to the 
undistributed profits tax did not subside.  According to Alfred Buehler, national and regional 
business associations “continued to direct broadsides of criticism against the measure because of 
its alleged complexities, inequalities, and unfortunate effects on corporations.”231  John Morton 
Blum recounted that, “[b]ecause that tax tended to return to stockholders the decision about how 
to spend or invest their money, it challenged the power of professional managers of large 
corporations.  These managers, their lawyers, and accountants, in all an able, articulate, and 
influential group, were aggressive opponents of the tax.”232  Republicans also helped sustain 
opposition by highlighting it during the 1936 election campaign as an example of the 
administration’s anti-business stance.233  Alf Landon, the Republican candidate for president, 
228 Decreed Dividends Opposed by Sloan, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1936, at 33.
229 Heated Debate on Taxes Forces Recess in Senate; Rise in Surtaxes Voted, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1936, at 1, 4.
230
 Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 14(b), 49 Stat. 1648, 1655.
231 BUEHLER, supra note 166, at 35.  See LAMBERT, supra note 157, at 409 (“Business representatives continued to 
complain that the law impaired the financial strength of corporations, imposed unreasonable penalties upon expansion, 
and retarded economic recovery.  Business executives, lawyers, and economists gloomily predicted that the levy on 
undivided corporate surpluses would lead to industrial stagnation, increased unemployment, and a financial collapse.”).  
For a typical expression of such sentiments, see, e.g., Executives Sound Confident Keynote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1937, at 
55 (year-end statement of W.G. Carey, president of Yale & Towne Manufacturing Co., assailing undistributed profit 
tax).
232 BLUM, supra note 170, at 321.
233 Id. at 36; HAWLEY, supra note 84, at 356.
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vowed to eliminate “this vicious method of taxation,” calling the undistributed profits tax “the 
most cockeyed piece of tax legislation ever imposed in a modern country.”234
Where managers were forced to increase their dividend distributions as a result of the 
1936 Act,235 they used it as another opportunity to publicly assail the undistributed profits tax.  
The National Association of Manufacturers spearheaded a campaign to send letters to 
shareholders explaining that a desire to avoid the tax, and not the exercise of business judgment, 
forced the extra dividends.236  In one example, a prominent oil company declared a special 
dividend with an accompanying explanation stating 
This special dividend declaration is made in order to reduce the company’s liability for 
the new Federal tax on undistributed earnings.  Because of the company’s needs for 
capital expenditures and debt payments, the directors would prefer to retain in the 
business the cash represented by this special dividend.  In any event, they would not 
ordinarily declare any dividend at this time with respect to earnings for the present 
calendar year, as such earnings cannot be known with sufficient exactness in the usual 
course of business for some time after year’s end.237
Similar statements accompanied announcements of other changes necessitated by the 
undistributed profits tax.  For example, the president of a public electric company explained that 
the directors voted in favor of a stock split with a reduction in stated par value because the tax 
would potentially interfere with plans for capital expenditures,238 and a steel corporation 
executive sent a letter to stockholders blaming the undistributed profits tax “for abandoning its 
old policy of financing expansion and improvements out of earnings.”239
Some corporate managers complemented their public activism against the tax by 
passively resisting its underlying principles.  Thus, they continued retaining profits either by 
resorting to taxable stock dividends or by agreeing to incur the undistributed profits tax penalty.  
The former method, although specifically recommended by Treasury officials during the 
hearings,240 was only used by a miniscule percent of the companies subject to the tax because of 
legal uncertainties.241  By contrast, a substantial number of managers simply chose to pay the tax 
234
 Alf M. Landon, Federal and Family Finances, II VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 763 (Sept. 15th, 1936).
235 See GEORGE E. LENT, THE IMPACT OF THE UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX 1936-1937 33 (1948) (concluding that the 
undistributed profits tax was responsible for an increase of dividends by one-third); E.J.H., Jr., Some Economic Aspects 
of the Surtax on Undistributed Profits of Corporations, 25 GEO. L.J. 423, 435 (1937) (“During the last few weeks of 
1936 announcements have been made of extra dividend, of bonuses, and of wage increases, running into millions of 
dollars.  Each day brings announcement of further actions of this character, and when the statistics are finally compiled 
for the calendar year 1936, the total of these disbursements will probably reach, if not pass, the half billion mark”).
236 See LEFF, supra note 11, at 249 (noting the advent of “NAM sponsored shareholder letters in 1936”).
237
 M.L. Seidman, The Stockholder Holds the Bag, 59 THE MAG. OF WALL STREET 156, 157 (1936).  For other 
examples, see Profits-Tax Levy Avoided By Trust, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1937, at 31 (“Distribution of extra and special 
dividends before the end of 1936 enabled Supervised Shares, Inc., to avoid liabilities under the tax on undistributed 
profits, Merrill Griswold, chairman, and Mahlon E. Traylor, president, said in a quarterly report issued yesterday.”).
238 See Will Balance Effect of Federal Surtax, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1937, at 24.
239 Financing Planned by Ludlum Steel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1937, at 31.
240 See supra text accompanying notes 202-03.
241 See William G. Christie & Vikram Nanda, Free Cash Flow, Shareholder Value, and the Undistributed Profits Tax 
of 1936 and 1937, 49 J. FIN. 1727, 1753 n.19 (1994) (one-third of one percent of all corporations subject to the tax 
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rather than distribute their free cash flow.  According to one recent study, a surprisingly high 
percentage of corporations paid marginal rates of 22% or more under the tax.242  Thus, managers 
in these corporations chose to incur the penalty either because of the deficiencies of shareholder 
monitoring or because shareholders implicitly or explicitly consented.
2. Recession of 1937
In the spring of 1937, a severe economic downturn opened a window of opportunity for 
managers to begin a campaign to repeal the undistributed profits tax.243  Critics blamed the tax 
either partially or completely for a variety of economic ills,244 including the decline of retail 
credit,245 delay and termination of expansion plans,246 lagging employment,247 the onset and 
aggravation of stock market volatility,248 and what the president of General Tire and Rubber 
Company called, “strikes by capital,” where a lull in business confidence caused both large and 
small-time capitalists as well as corporate financiers to keep their money on the sidelines rather 
than to invest in business.249  Horace Stoneham, the president of the New York Giants 
professional baseball team, even went so far as to blame the undistributed profits tax for his 
team’s inability to sign a high profile star like Joe Medwick of the St. Louis Cardinals.250
issued taxable stock dividends); Godfrey N. Nelson, Law Still is Hazy on Stock Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1936, 
sec. III, at 1.
242 See Charles W. Calomiris & R. Glenn Hubbard, Internal Evidence and Investment:  Evidence From the 
Undistributed Profits Tax of 1936-1937 12 -13 (1993), in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 
SERIES (Working Paper No. 4288) (between 17 and 23% of small to medium-sized corporations).
243
 “Before the economy picked up in the late spring of 1938,” Mark Leff observed, “industrial production fell by a 
third, durable-goods production and stock prices slipped by half, and profits skidded to one-fifth their 1937 highs.  
Unemployment, always a tragic embarrassment to the New Deal, shot up by nearly 4 million.”  See LEFF, supra note 
11, at 209.  
244
 Another tax provision cited as a cause of the economic downturn was the capital gains tax.  See Tax Modification 
Asked as Trade Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1937, at 28.  
245 See Profits Tax Slows Recovery, He Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1937, at 20.
246 See Levy on Profits Halts Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1937, at 24.
247 15 Criticisms Made of the Profit Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1937, at 24 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce study); 
Surplus Tax Repeal Held Labor Benefit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1937, § III, at 8 (National Association of Manufacturers 
Study).
248 See Editorial, A Tax Theory Demolished, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1937, at 4; Our Taxes Too High, Periling Business, 
Tremaine Asserts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1937, at 1 (“[New York State Controller] Tremaine blamed the stock market 
slump directly upon the Federal Capital Gains and Losses Tax, and the Undistributed Profits Tax.”); Ballantine Finds 
New Deal Harmful, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1937, at 10 (highlighting the undistributed profits tax among New Deal 
programs “as responsible for the current stock market slump”).
249 Capital ‘Strikes’ Laid to Tax Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1937, at 25; Profits Tax Held Bar to Confidence, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1937, at 33.
250 Unfair to Baseball, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 11, 1937, at 44.  According to Stoneham, “[i]f you wanted to spend your 
surplus on ball players, the government would step in and stop you.  That sort of thing is inimical to baseball.  If you 
make a lot of money you want to make more by strengthening your club.  But you cannot do what you please.  You’ve 
got to distribute a large part of your profits to stockholders.”  Id. 
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Although economists refuted claims that the undistributed profits tax was responsible for 
starting the recession,251 corporate managers blamed the tax on creating “a climate of fear and 
uncertainty” that both contributed to the recession and made recovery more difficult.252
Prominent business leaders such as the president of Chemical Bank advocated repeal “as a means 
of restoring confidence among business men.”253  The American Institute of Accountants issued a 
report declaring that in order for business “to face the future confidently” Congress must return to 
“fixed principles of taxation” and abandon the failed undistributed profits tax.254
3. Revenue Act of 1938
The combination of the recession and business' steady campaign against the tax sealed its 
fate.  The only question in 1938 was whether it would be repealed outright or merely nullified by 
reducing its rate so low that it no longer acted as an incentive to distribute profits. 
Although Congress initially aimed for the latter option,255 business leaders were not satisfied.  
They argued that maintaining even the nominal undistributed profits tax proposed in the 
subcommittee report was unacceptable.  During hearings before the House Ways and Means 
Committee in January of 1938, the United States Chamber of Commerce recommended 
“[r]epeal[ing] the thoroughly discredited undistributed profits tax and openly abandon[ing] the 
‘principle.’”256  As one railroad executive noted, nothing short of repeal would be sufficient:  
“The continuation of this tax, even in the modified form proposed, will continue to hamper 
business and destroy the confidence of business management in its ability to look ahead and to 
plan and enter into long-time commitments, which constitutes the very essence of recovery.  This 
251 See Eased Income Tax Urged By Tremaine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1937, pt. 1 at 1, 12 (“Dr. Willard L. Thorp, 
director of economic research for Dun & Bradstreet, said there was ‘danger in saying that the undistributed profits tax 
was responsible for the recession.’  He declared there would have been a slump if there had been no such tax.”).
252 LAMBERT, supra note 157, at 414.  See Lewis H. Kimmel, Experience Under the Undistributed Profits Tax, 11 
CONF. BOARD BULL. 105, 105-15 (1937) (survey of 360 corporate executives revealed that many corporate expansion 
plans were delayed by fear of the tax’s effect on surpluses); Godfrey N. Nelson, Loss of Confidence Laid to Tax of 
1936, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1938, § III, at 1 (“[T]he results of research show that the undistributed-profits tax is one of 
the major causes of the loss of business confidence.”).
253 F.K. Houston Urges Repeal of Two Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1937, at 33.
254 Taxation Found ‘Bugaboo’ of Corporations; Accountants Advocate Nonpartisan Study, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1937, 
at 41.
255
 A subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee proposed merging the undistributed profits tax with the 
corporate income tax so that the corporate rate would rise or fall between 16 and 20 percent depending upon the 
percentage of profits distributed.  See Steven A. Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double 
Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 167, 239-40 (2002).  The net effect would be to make the 4 percent pressure to 
distribute identical to the 4 percent tax on dividends, and thus pressure not to distribute.
256 Revision of Revenue Laws 1938:  Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 75th Cong. § 104, at 468 
(1938) (prepared statement of Ellsworth C. Alvord, Chamber of Commerce of the United States).  See also id. at 155 
(statement of M.L. Seidman, New York Board of Trade) (“The undistributed profits tax stands before the country today 
thoroughly convicted as an undesirable tax and as harmful to business and to confidence.  It has earned its execution.  
Let it die.”).
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tax should be repealed in its entirety.”257  While corporate managers spoke of the hardships still 
imposed under the revised tax, the principal concern appeared to be that retaining the principle
would invite the reintroduction of more meaningful rates in subsequent years.258
The proposal to retain the undistributed profits tax principle received an equally chilly reception 
in the hearings before the Senate Finance Committee. The chair of the committee, Senator Pat 
Harrison, issued a statement announcing his intent to secure the tax’s repeal:  “While the House 
retained only the skeleton of the undistributed profits tax . . . the remains will haunt business, and 
its complete removal and return to a sufficient flat corporation tax is preferable.”259  This echoed 
the sentiments of most business leaders.  A representative of the Brooklyn Chamber of 
Commerce warned that retaining the principle would make it “an ever-constant threat,”260 while 
M.L. Seidman of the New York Board of Trade predicted that “it would remain to haunt business, 
not only for what it is, but also for what it may eventually grow into if permitted to remain as a 
permanent part of our tax structure.”261  Ellsworth Alvord of the United States Chamber of 
Commerce asked “if you impose 3½ percent this year . . . what is there to assure a businessmen 
that you will not boost that penalty to 42½ percent as was proposed two years ago?”262
As expected, both the Senate Finance Committee and the Senate heeded business’ 
complaints and overwhelmingly voted to repeal the undistributed profits tax altogether.263  Only a 
last-ditch effort by President Roosevelt led to what one conferee called a “face-saving 
compromise” in the Conference Committee.264  The tax was retained at the very low rate of 2.5 
percent, but it was scheduled to expire after 1939.265  While Roosevelt hoped to revive it at a later 
date, the opposition was still too great.  As Robert La Follette, the lone senator who publicly 
challenged the repeal, observed the undistributed profits tax “has been the object of one of the 
257 Id. at 401 (statement of George Houston, president Baldwin Locomotive Works).
258 See, e.g., Tax Bill Sent to Conference, House Not Yielding on Changes, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 1938, at 1 (Rep. 
Lamneck of Ohio “declared that the business interests were absolutely opposed to the undistributed profits tax theory, 
as retained in the House bill, ‘not because it is going to levy a high tax on them, but because they fear we may use the 
principle to raise the rates and change the schedule.’”).
259 Harrison Demands End of Profits Tax to Help Business, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1938, at 1.
260 Revenue Act of 1938:  Hearing on H.R. 9682 Before the Sen. Comm. on Finance, 75th Cong. 183 (1938) (“1938 
Senate Hearings”) (statement of J.W. Hooper, Chairman of the Federal Tax Committee, Brooklyn Chamber of 
Commerce).
261 Id. at 257 (statement of M.L. Seidman, Chairman of Taxation Committee, New York Board of Trade).
262 Id. at 469 (statement of Ellsworth Alvord, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).  See also id. at 19 (statement of Henry H. 
Heimann, National Association of Credit Men) (“We think that the present undistributed profits tax will not constitute 
the menace, the penalty that it has in the past, but nevertheless we still believe the principle of the tax is dangerous, and 
there is no assurance at any time that the law may not be changed with respect to rates so that the same danger that was 
inherent in the 1936 bill will again become included in the bill.”).
263 See Lauren D. Lyman, Profit Tax Eliminated, Gains Levy is Modified by Senate Finance Group, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
25, 1938, at 1 (17-4 vote); Senate Approves Most of Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1938, at 13 (41-27 vote).
264 Profits Tax Looms as Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1938, at 4.
265 Modified Surplus Tax for Two Years Retained in Senate-House Compromise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1938, at 1.
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most widely organized and most successful propaganda campaigns in the history of tax 
legislation.”266
III. A CORPORATE NORMS-BASED EXPLANATION
What accounts for the difference in corporate managers' reactions to the two proposals?  
Both appeared to be attempts to restrict behavior in ways that under traditional agency cost theory 
analysis managers were likely to oppose.  In the case of tax-free reorganizations, the elimination 
or restriction of this option would likely decrease a manager's ability to expand his empire and 
pursue pet projects.  In the case of the undistributed profits tax, the crimp on managerial 
discretion over dividend policy and resulting decline in free cash flow would either reduce their 
ability to pursue individual projects or force them to be subjected to the scrutiny of the capital 
markets.
Some of the difference in reaction may have been the result of the peculiar political and 
economic circumstances of the day.  During President Roosevelt's first term, when the Revenue 
Act of 1934 was introduced and the stock market crash was still a recent memory, business may 
have been inclined to be more cooperative in its dealings with the administration.267  By the time 
the undistributed profits tax was enacted, however, the political climate had changed.  Roosevelt 
was perhaps at the height of his power in 1936, but in reaching that point he had sabotaged any 
possibility of working together with business.268  The fact that Roosevelt himself had initiated the 
undistributed profits tax proposal while the recommendation to abolish the tax-free 
reorganization came from a Congressional subcommittee may have heightened the stakes from 
266 1938 Senate Hearings, supra note 260, at 4932 (statement of Senator La Follette).  La Follette’s Investigating 
Committee in the Senate found that the National Association of Manufacturers had spent almost $1 million a year 
fighting the undistributed profits tax since its passage.  In conjunction with the efforts of other groups such as the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, “every known medium of reaching the public with their propaganda has been used, including 
advertising in the daily and weekly newspapers, and colored news articles.  The [La Follette Investigating Committee] 
records show they have also used direct mail, booklets, leaflets, bulletin board posters, 24 sheet posters for outdoor 
boards, pay envelope slips, sound slide films, moving picture slides, plant publications and house organ service, nation-
wide radio programs, including the “American Family Robinson” cartoon service and the “Uncle Abner” series and 
under many other names.”  W.D. McFarlane, Weekly Newsletter, WICHITA BANNER, March 11, 1938, in William 
Doddridge McFarlane Papers, 1919-1981, Box No. 3U265, Center for American History, University of Texas. 
267 See LEFF, supra note 11, at 133 (“Earlier in the New Deal, with economic survival and political stability hanging in 
the balance, businessmen had good reason to go along with the New Deal’s ‘concert of interests’ theme.”); BEARD & 
BEARD, supra note 36, at 244 (observing that during the spring and summer of 1933, "[p]owerful business leaders 
cooperated with the administration in a spirit of cheerful compliance contrasting sharply with the hostility which they 
had displayed toward Bryanism, Progressivism, and the New Freedom.").  This conciliatory position may have been 
adopted out of necessity.  As Richard Hofstadter observed, "the coming of the depression and the revelation of some of 
the less palatable business practices of the 1920's brought about a climate of opinion in which the leadership of 
business, and particularly of big business, was profoundly distrusted and bitterly resented.  Its position certainly was, in 
these respects, considerably weaker than it had been twenty-five years before."  RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF 
REFORM 312 (1955). 
268 See CONKIN, supra note 65, at 81 (describing Roosevelt's campaign for presidency in 1936 as "a much more 
aggressive, even provocative campaign than in 1932, with angry jabs at economic autocracy, organized money, 
economic tyranny, and forces of selfishness and lust for power.").
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the perspective of business leaders.  By 1937-38 when the country was in the throes of another 
economic downturn, the tide had turned and business leaders had more leverage to use in the 
fight against purportedly anti-business measures.269
While the timing factor is not insignificant, it should not be overstated.  Business started 
to criticize the administration as early as the fall of 1933 and the beginning of 1934.270  A 
temporary truce was not declared until after the elections in 1934, which was well after the 
reorganization provisions had been amended.271 Moreover, even if business leaders had resisted 
opposing the reform because of their pledge to cooperate with the recovery program, it should not 
have prevented them from repealing the restrictions once they felt their compact with the 
administration had been broken.  They did this not only in their battle over the undistributed 
profits tax, but also in reversing the abolition of the consolidated return.272
It is also possible that the difference in reaction was in part a reflection of the extent of 
the underlying changes in the current tax law.  Ever since 1918, managers had been subject to a 
fairly strict set of requirements in order to qualify their transactions as tax-free reorganizations.  
Moreover, the final changes enacted, while considered substantial by tax practitioners, still left 
intact the basic scheme for such transactions.  In that sense, the changes might not be described as 
"revolutionary."  By contrast, there was no undistributed profits tax prior to 1936.  President 
Roosevelt's proposal to eliminate the corporate income tax and the dividend exemption, while 
subjecting undistributed profits to a high levy, would have been a sharp change from the 
corporate tax system that had developed during the preceding two decades.
Cutting against the merit of a degree-of-change-based argument is that the undistributed 
profits tax also was not altogether new.  From the beginning of the income tax in 1913, managers 
had been subject to an accumulated earnings tax on earnings retained for the purpose of evading 
the surtax rates.  While this provision was often not enforced because of the difficulty of proving 
intent, its use had been upheld in a 1936 Board of Tax Appeals case,273 which was eventually 
affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1938.274  In 1934, Congress adopted a personal holding 
company tax for smaller companies that omitted an intent requirement.275  While neither of these 
269 See LEFF, supra note 11, at 231 (“Until 1937, the Roosevelt administration set the terms of debate on taxation.  But 
the recession changed that, allowing the business community to take charge.”).  
270 See HAWLEY, supra note 84, at 151; BEARD & BEARD, supra note 36, at 245.
271 Id. at 153.
272
 Starting in 1918, corporations that were considered "affiliated" under the tax laws because of their common stock 
ownership or parent-subsidiary relationship were permitted to file a single return that reflected the consolidated income 
of the group.  In 1932, Congress began to impose an additional tax for the privilege of filing a consolidated return and 
in 1934, the consolidated return was abolished completely except for railroads.  See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, supra
note 11, at 177-78.  This repeal was justified as part of an attack on the holding company structure.  See Tax Bill 
Changes Offered by Borah, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1934, at 38; Daniel C. Schaffer, The Income Tax on Intercorporate 
Dividends, 33 TAX LAW. 161, 165 (1979).  By 1942, Congress revived the consolidated return, although it still 
subjected the return to an additional tax.  Id. at 168-69.
273
 Nat'l Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 163, 167 (1936).
274
 Helvering v. Nat'l Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 291 (1938).
275
 48 Stat. 751 (1934).
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provisions approached the expansive reach of the undistributed profits tax proposal,276 they did 
introduce corporate managers to the concept of a tax limitation on dividend policy.  
The full legislative histories of the two provisions further weaken the substantive 
argument regarding the extent of the change.  From an ex ante perspective, the original proposal 
to abolish the reorganization provisions was just as radical as the undistributed profits tax 
proposal and yet it was not subject to nearly as much active opposition from business leaders.  
Moreover, from an ex poste perspective, business leaders were eager to eliminate all traces of the 
undistributed profits tax in 1938, notwithstanding the reduction of the rate to a level that would 
make it a non-factor in dividend decisions, while there was no similar attempt to further reduce 
the restrictions on tax-free reorganizations after the 1934 Act was passed.
Thus, while a variety of historical and statute-specific factors may have influenced the 
different reactions to the two proposals, they do not, either individually or in the aggregate, offer 
a complete explanation.  There is one potential factor, however, that has not been explored -- the 
underlying norms that governed the behavior Congress sought to regulate through the tax laws.  
In the case of reorganizations, mergers and acquisitions were historically subject to the oversight 
of both shareholders and the state legislature and managers were not accustomed to free rein in 
this area.  By contrast, dividend policy had always been the exclusive province of directors.  This 
distinction may have affected managerial attitudes toward the government's attempt to regulate 
those areas through the tax laws.
A. Mergers and Acquisitions
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, managers were subject to heavy 
constraints on their ability to cause the corporation to engage in a merger or acquisition.  First, 
such transactions were subject to a shareholder vote, often one that required unanimous or near-
unanimous consent.  Second, for most fundamental corporate changes such as mergers and 
consolidations, managers had to secure the approval of the state, either by statute or via a 
provision in their corporate charter.  Third, the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 
introduced federal oversight on mergers and combinations.  The combined effect of these 
constraints was to undercut any notion of managerial primacy on the issue of mergers and 
acquisitions.  Thus, it is not surprising that managers responded to the proposed changes with 
relatively muted rhetoric.
1. Shareholder approval
There is a long tradition of shareholder primacy in the context of a fundamental corporate 
change.  During the mid-to-late nineteenth century, almost all courts required the unanimous 
consent of shareholders before a corporation could pursue transactions such as a merger, 
276 See Paul Marcuse, Taxation of Undistributed Profits, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 1, 8 (1937) (recounting the history and 
deficiencies of the two provisions). 
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acquisition, or sale of assets.277  Thus, while corporate managers could initiate these and other 
similar transactions, shareholders were empowered with the ability to block such transaction 
simply by withholding their consent.
The theory underlying the unanimous consent requirement was that a fundamental 
corporate change constituted a breach of the shareholder's contract and a violation of his property 
rights.278  As to the former justification for unanimity, the argument was that a shareholder 
entered into a contract with the corporation when he purchased its stock.  This contract, deriving 
some of its content from the ultra vires doctrine,279 implied that the corporation had a duty to 
continue in operation under roughly the same terms as it had done at the time of purchase.  By 
merging with another corporation or selling all of its assets, the corporation effectively abandoned 
its former charter and thereby breached the contract.280  As to the latter justification for 
unanimity, the concern was that the shareholder's property interest in the business' assets would 
be taken through a transfer of the assets.
In 1890, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the unanimous consent requirement to 
invalidate a transaction in Mason v. Pewabic Mining Company.281  In the case, the taxpayer's 
charter had expired and the company was in the process of winding up its affairs.282  The directors 
and a majority of the stockholders sought to transfer the assets to a new corporation, of which 
they would be directors and stockholders, in exchange for shares of stock in the new corporation 
or their equivalent value.283  The Court upheld the dissenting stockholders' right to block the 
transfer.  According to the Court, "there is no superior right in two or three men in the old 
company, who may hold a preponderance of the stock, to acquire an absolute control of the whole 
of it, in the way which they may think to be for the interest of the whole. . . . [W]e know of no 
reason or authority why those holding a majority of the stock can place a value upon it at which a 
dissenting minority must sell, or do something else which they think is against their interest, more 
than a minority can do."284
277 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 87 (1992); VICTOR MORAWETZ, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 54, at 49 (1882); GEORGE W. FIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 168 (1877); Kean v. Central Railroad Co., 9 N.J. Eq. 401; 1800 WL 2297, 1, 5 (N.J. Ch., 
1853).
278 HORWITZ, supra note 277, at 87.
279 Id. at 86-87.
280 See, e.g., Kean, 1800 WL 2297, at 9 ("That the majority should have the power claimed for them, does not seem to 
me to be the contract between the stockholders, for there is a contract, as already shown in the case of every 
corporation, between them.  That contract is, that their joint funds shall, under the care of specified persons, generally 
called directors, be employed, and that for certain specified purposes.").  The modern concept of dissenter's right to the 
value of his shares was not considered satisfactory under the unanimous consent requirement.  Id. at 10 ("It can hardly, 
therefore, I think, be argued with justice, that a majority of the stockholders had a right, upon principle, to sell out all 
the property of the company from which its profits were to be realized and abandon the business, and that the 
minority's rights are satisfied by a division to them of the value of their stock."). 
281
 Mason et al. v. Pewabic Min. Co., 10 S. Ct. 224 (1890).  
282 Id. at 224-25.
283 Id. at 225.
284 Id. at 226.
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This principle of unanimity continued to be the common law rule well into the twentieth 
century.285  According to the 1927 edition of a contemporary treatise, “[i]n the absence of 
statutory authority the consent of every stockholder is absolutely essential to a consolidation; and 
dissenting stockholders can not be compelled to give their assent.”286  Even where a charter 
provided that in the absence of specific direction the company shall have the greatest rights and 
privileges accorded to a corporation of its type, the courts refused to approve a consolidation with 
less than unanimous shareholder approval.287
While the unanimous consent requirement could be and was relaxed by state statute in 
some jurisdictions by the 1930s,288 directors were still subordinated to the shareholders on the 
issue of fundamental corporate change.  As William Meade Fletcher explained in the 1919 edition 
of his Cyclopedia on the Law of Private Corporations, "[c]onsolidation cannot be effected by the 
action of the boards of directors but must be consented to by at least a majority of the 
stockholders."289  The same rules were in place for a sale of all of the assets of a corporation, 
where, according to one contemporary commentator nearly half of the state statutes had 
abandoned the unanimous consent requirement, but all still required at least a majority.290
Sometimes this meant a majority of the stock ownership, so that in practice a few stockholders 
could still control,291  although occasionally it simply meant a majority or more of the 
stockholders present at a duly called meeting in which at least a quorum was present.292
Typically, the requirement for "majority" approval meant considerably more than that, often 
requiring two-thirds or even three-quarters or four-fifths of the shareholders to consent to the 
transaction.293  When there were multiple classes of voting stock present, each class was required 
to approve the transaction by the minimum percentage.294
285
 The use of the phrase "common law" here is not to suggest that the merger was possible under the common law, but 
rather that in the absence of statutory direction in a jurisdiction where a merger was permitted, unanimous consent was 
required.
286 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON & JOSEPH W. THOMPSON, 8 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 93 (3d ed. 
1927).
287 Id. at 95 (citing Botts v. Simpsonville &c. Tpk. Rd. Co., 88 Ky. 54).
288 See HORWITZ, supra note 277, at 88 (citing Delaware, New York, and New Jersey among those states permitting 
mergers with less than unanimous consent).  The requirement had actually been relaxed by state statute in some 
jurisdictions early on in the nineteenth century.  See, e.g., Mass. Acts & Resolves, ch. 223, § 11 (1849) (majority); N.J. 
Acts, § 1, at 124 (1831) (seven-eighths); Pa. Laws, No. 197, § 3 (1856) (two-thirds).
289
 See WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 7 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 8326 (1919).
290 See Kenneth Field, Nature of a Procedure for Direct Property Owning Consolidations, 5 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 230, 
242 (1933).
291 FLETCHER, supra note 289, at 8329 ("where each share of stock is entitled to one vote the per cent is to be figured on 
the number of shares and not the number of holders.").
292
 Under the Michigan statute, for example, directors needed to secure the consent of two-thirds of the stockholders 
constituting a quorum.  See THOMPSON & THOMPSON, supra note 286, at 95; Comment, Statutory Merger and 
Consolidation of Corporations, 45 YALE L. J. 105, 113 n. 43 (1935) ("As a general rule the required proportion must be 
of the total capital stock outstanding, though the Virginia statute seems to require only that their be approval by a 
majority of the votes cast.").  
293 See ROBERT S. STEVENS & ARTHUR LARSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 985 (1947); 
Comment, supra, note 292 at 107 n. 8 ("At the present time statutory provisions in forty states authorize sales of entire 
corporate assets on the consent of proportions of stockholders varying from a majority to four-fifths."); Field, supra
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Even where the decision to merge was approved by at least the required percentage, the 
merger could still be overturned by the courts if it was deemed unfair to the minority.  In New 
Jersey, for example, the court of chancery enjoined the merger of five public utility companies 
into the Public Service Electric and Gas Company despite the fact that Public Service owned 
more than two-thirds of the capital stock of the merging companies and could therefore satisfy 
New Jersey's minimum approval requirement.295  The minority shareholders complained that the 
preferred stock they were to receive in exchange for their common stock was actually less secure 
than their previous holdings.  The court held that "the merger, in effect, is nothing less than a 
forced sale by the majority stockholders to itself at a price fixed by it and payable at its pleasure.  
The preferred stock is but the equivalent of a six per cent. promissory note payable in three years 
at the option of the buyer.  The merger legislation countenances no such perversion of the 
contractual obligations of stockholders inter sese.  Continued membership, until dissolution is an 
inherent property right in corporate existence."296  The court thus effectively limited the majority's 
right to engage in a "freeze out" merger.297
2. Legislative approval
Although corporations could generally sell and acquire large amounts of assets under the 
common law,298 there was no implied right to merge or consolidate with another company.299
Corporations needed to secure the consent of the legislature in order to engage in a merger or 
consolidation.300  As William Meade Fletcher put it, "[l]egislative authority is just as essential to 
a valid consolidation or merger of existing corporations as it is to the creation of a corporation in 
note 290, at 230 ("The most common requirement is that the holders of two-thirds of the outstanding stock vote in 
favor of the consolidation; but there is no uniformity from state to state -- the amounts varying from a mere majority of 
the votes cast to 100 per cent of the stock outstanding.").
294 See Comment, supra note 292, at 114.
295
 Outwater v. Pub. Serv. Corp. of N.J., 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 A. 729 (1928). 
296 Id., 103 N.J. Eq. at 466. 
297 See CHESTER ROHRLICH, LAW AND PRACTICE IN CORPORATE CONTROL 137 (1933).
298 See Field, supra note 290, at 242 ("In the absence of express restrictions, business corporations have the implied 
power to convey any or all of their real or personal property.").  Some authorities suggested that such a right was 
limited to a sale required by the exigencies of the business.  See HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON 
CORPORATIONS 209 (1927) ("A purely private business corporation, like a manufacturing or trading company, which is 
not given the right of eminent domain, and which owes no special duties to the public, may sell and convey absolutely 
the whole of its property, when the exigencies of its business require it to do so, or when the circumstances are such 
that it can no longer profitably continue its business."); WILLIAM W. COOK, THE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAW 437 
(1931) (“Neither the directors nor the majority of the stockholders have power to sell all the corporate property as 
against the dissent of a single stockholder, unless the corporation is in a failing condition.”).
299
 See FLETCHER, supra note 284, at 8313; FIELD, supra note 277, at 461.
300 See WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 191 (3d ed., I. Maurice Wormser, 
ed., 1916) ("A corporation has no power to consolidate with another corporation, unless the power is expressly 
conferred upon it.").
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the first instance."301  This could either come from a specific grant of authority in the 
corporation's original charter or via a general grant of authority by state statute.302
In many states, the principal problem was that there was no merger or consolidation 
statute that blessed such transactions.  At the time that the tax-free reorganization provision was 
being considered in 1934, only thirty-three states and the Territory of Hawaii had general statutes 
authorizing corporations to merge or consolidate.303  The fourteen remaining states, plus Alaska, 
the District of Columbia, the Philippine Islands, and Puerto Rico had no special provisions for 
conferring such authority.304  Thus, in the absence of a charter provision or special act of the 
legislature, corporations in those states where not eligible to participate in such transactions.305
Even where a state merger statute existed, it was often limited in scope.  Most of the 
early state law merger statutes restricted mergers based on the powers granted to the corporations 
under their respective charters.  The concern appeared to be that an activity that would be ultra 
vires under the charter of one corporation would suddenly become acceptable by virtue of the 
more permissive charter of the combined enterprise.  Thus, for example, in New Jersey, the right 
to merge or consolidate was restricted to corporations organized to undertake “any kind of 
business of the same or similar nature,” the nature of the business being determined by the charter 
or certificate of incorporation.306  Under this provision, the New Jersey courts denied permission 
for the consolidation of the United States Leather Company and the Central Leather Company 
because, even though the companies were generally engaged in the same line of business, the 
charter of one contained broader powers than the charter of the other.307
During this same period, there were other similar examples of purpose and geographical 
restrictions.  New York only permitted the consolidation of corporations incorporated "for 
kindred purposes." 308  Connecticut limited its statute to parties "carrying on business of the same 
or a similar nature."309  Illinois only permitted consolidation of "corporations of the same kind 
and engaged in the same general business and carrying on their business in the same vicinity."310
Moreover,  while most such purpose restrictions had been removed or weakened by the 1930s,311
many statutes still restricted a corporation's ability to merge or consolidate with a corporation 
from another state, either by denying the power to engage in the transaction altogether or by a 
301 FLETCHER, supra note 284, at 8313.
302 CLARK, supra note 300, at 192; FLETCHER, supra note 284, at 8315.
303 See Bank, Federalizing the Tax-Free Merger, supra note 72, at 1355.
304 Id.
305
 As one commentator notes, parties frequently got around this limitation by engaging in a sale or similar transaction 
that had the same result as a merger or consolidation.  See Comment, supra note 292, at 110 n.24.  In that case, the 
transaction would still be subject to the restrictions governing shareholder approval on fundamental corporate changes 
and to other restrictions on sales of assets.  See infra text accompany note 299. 
306 FLETCHER, supra note 284, at 8322.
307 See Colgate v. United States Leather Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 229, 239-40 (1909).
308 See FLETCHER, supra note 284, at 8323.
309
 Conn. Public Acts, ch. 157 (1901).
310
 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 31, §§ 50, 52 (1895).
311 See Comment, supra note 292, at 110 (purpose restrictions were still relevant, though, for public utilities, insurance 
companies, banks, and trust companies).
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requirement that the surviving party be a domestic corporation.312  In some cases, the merger or 
consolidation even had to be approved by a state regulatory board or corporation commission to 
be effective.313
While sales of large amounts of corporate assets were permitted under the common law, 
they were often subject to many of the same statutory restrictions as mergers or consolidations.  
According to one contemporary commentator, "[a]lthough merger and consolidation is strictly 
statutory and a sale of assets is essentially contractual, as a practical matter in a given case it may 
be extremely difficult to decide whether the device employed was merger and consolidation or a 
sale of assets inasmuch as today, the latter also usually follows a statutory procedure."314
3. Federal oversight
In addition to the oversight exercised by state legislatures, fundamental corporate 
changes were subject to federal oversight.  The earliest and most prominent source of this 
oversight was the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.  Adopted in 1890, this act held that "every contract, 
combination, in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several states or with foreign nations" was illegal.315  Vague language, the failure to 
provide for an agency to implement the Act, and the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the 
law hampered its effectiveness,316 but it provided the basis for later federal challenges of merger 
activity during Theodore Roosevelt’s administration.
In 1902, Roosevelt directed his attorney general to revive the then-dormant Sherman Act 
by pursuing an antitrust action against the Northern Securities Company.317  Two years later, the 
Court ordered the company’s dissolution.  Emboldened by his success, which earned him the 
“trust-buster” label, Roosevelt set his sights on even bigger targets.  Thus, Roosevelt brought 
separate federal antitrust actions against the Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco 
Company.  After protracted litigation, in 1911 the Supreme Court issued opinions ordering that 
both Standard Oil and American Tobacco be broken up into several smaller companies.318  While 
312
 Bank, Federalizing the Tax-Free Merger, supra note 72, at 1355.
313 See Comment, supra note 292, at 114.
314 Id. at 107 (noting, however, that the statutes governing sales of entire corporate assets differed in form and 
substance from those governing mergers or consolidations); BALLANTINE, supra note 298, at 210 ("In recent years 
statutes authorizing such disposition [of the entire property of the corporation] by the consent of a majority, or two-
thirds or three-quarters of the stockholders of a solvent, going concern have become common.").
315
 Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209.
316 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 465 (1985); HORWITZ, supra note 277, at 84; GEISST, 
supra note 36, at 104-05; JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY:  A SHORT HISTORY OF A 
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 73 (2003).  The Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act was inapplicable to manufacturing 
companies because they did not engage in "commerce."  See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 56 U.S. 2 (1895).
317 See ROBERT L. HEILBRONER & AARON SINGER, THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA:  1600 TO THE 
PRESENT 212 (2d ed. 1984).
318
 The Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey et al. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 79-80 (1911); U.S. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 
106, 187-88 (1911).
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these victories were far from complete, they did mark a departure from “the uncritical approval of 
business expansion” that characterized the early-to-mid nineteenth century.319
Perhaps more importantly, the results may have chilled some transactions.  According to 
one 1913 edition of a practitioner's treatise, "the general result of the federal decisions in the 
Tobacco, Standard Oil, and other similar cases has been to leave the situation in perplexing 
uncertainty.  At the present time it is not possible for counsel to advise what can be safely done in 
forming industrial combinations."320  The same treatise noted that "[a]t present few new 
combinations are being formed.  The Sherman Anti-Trust Law, after many years of more or less 
innocuous desuetude, finally became a live law.  The business world, which had considered its 
provisions negligible, was dismayed to find that it really meant something and that it could be 
enforced against the largest and most firmly entrenched combinations."321
Soon after the resolution of the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases, Congress 
enacted the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914 to further buttress Federal oversight in this area.322  By 
outlawing interlocking directorates, Congress sought to prevent indirect combinations of 
companies that were in restraint of trade.323  Unlike the Sherman Act, this measure was 
accompanied by the creation of an enforcement agency, the Federal Trade Commission, which 
served to investigate unfair trade practices and issue cease and desist orders.324
While neither the Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act posed serious obstacles to business 
combinations,325 they had established the specter of federal oversight.  The threat of antitrust 
enforcement action meant that even directors of corporations with willing shareholders and 
permissive state merger statutes did not have a free hand to engage in transactions as they saw fit.     
B. Dividend Policies
While managers were accustomed to strict limitations on their abilities to engage in 
mergers, acquisitions, and other fundamental corporate changes, it was a different story when it 
came to dividend policy.  There were some limitations on the source of a dividend payment, but 
these related to the source of funds, rather than the decision to issue a dividend.  The decision 
whether to issue a dividend or retain the profits for other uses was committed to the discretion of 
the board of directors by well-established law. Moreover, this legal right to retain earnings was 
buttressed by the business custom, which took hold around the turn-of-the-century, of retaining a 
significant percentage of earnings each year.  Thus, it should not be surprising that corporate 
319 HEILBRONER & SINGER, supra note 317, at 213.
320 THOMAS CONYNGTON, A MANUAL OF CORPORATE ORGANIZATION 350 (3d ed. 1913).  Part of the uncertainty was the 
Court's use of the "rule of reason" approach, which meant that some combinations in restraint of trade could be 
permitted if they were reasonable under the circumstances. 
321 Id. at 357.
322
 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1914).
323 See GEISST, supra note 36, at 143-44.
324
 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1914).
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 Indeed, the great merger movement at the turn-of-the-century followed the passage of the Sherman Act.
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managers mounted an all-out assault against the undistributed profits tax and its threat to their 
continued discretion over dividend policy.
1. Early history
In the infancy of the corporation, dividends were essentially unregulated.326  This was in 
part because during the days of the joint stock trading company, a corporation would distribute 
all of its assets at the completion of each voyage.327  There was little need to impose significant 
limits on the distribution of profits in these essentially single-purpose enterprises.  This era of 
unregulated dividends, however, soon came to an end because of two developments in corporate 
law and finance.  First, the advent of the concept of fixed, or permanent, capital from which a 
corporation’s earnings would flow meant that there had to be some method of distinguishing 
between that part of the corporation’s assets that was available for distribution as a dividend and 
that part of the assets that constituted its capital and would remain within the corporation.  
Second, the development of limited liability for corporate stockholders elevated the importance 
of both the distinction between capital and income and the distinction between the assets in the 
hands of the corporation and the assets in the hands of its stockholders.  The former was 
important because under a system of limited liability creditors would often decide to extend 
credit based upon the value and availability of the fixed or permanent property of the corporation.  
If this property were subject to division prior to the liquidation of the corporation, the creditors 
would have virtually no protection at all.  The latter was important because, unlike the general 
partnership where partners remained personally liable for the partnership debts even after a 
distribution, the creditors’ only recourse for repayment of the debts was to look to the assets 
while held in the corporation.  A dividend would permanently remove those assets from the 
corporate solution.  These two developments led to a spate of statutory and non-statutory 
limitations on the distribution of profits in a corporation.  
2. Dividends paid out of "profits"
The first limitation on dividends was the requirement that dividends be paid exclusively 
from the profits of the corporation, as distinct from the “capital,” or the money originally 
contributed by the stockholders.328  Initially, companies followed such a rule by custom.  Thus, 
326 See Donald Kehl, The Origin and Early Development of American Dividend Law, 53 HARV. L. REV. 36, 37 (1939).
327 Id. at 37-38.  This was true even in the colonies, where a non-chartered joint stock company, Plymouth Adventurers, 
provided that after seven years “the capitall and profits, viz. The houses, lands, goods and chattels be equally divided 
amongst the adventurers.”  Id. at 43.
328 See VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 435 410 (2d ed. 1886) (“It is a 
fundamental rule, that dividends can be paid only out of profits or the net increase of the capital of a corporation, and 
cannot be drawn upon the capital contributed by the shareholders for the purpose of carrying on the company’s 
business.”); Cyrus LaRue Munson, Dividends, 1 YALE L.J. 193 (1891) (“It is fundamental that dividends are payable 
only from the profits of the corporation, and that they cannot be paid from any portion of the capital stock, from 
compensation for property taken under the power of eminent domain, from a penalty recovered from a contractor for a 
failure to complete his work, or from the sale of forfeited stock.”).
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after the British East India Company established a permanent joint stock in 1657, dividends were 
henceforth issued “out of profits leaving the capital untouched.”329  Before long, however, the 
Crown began to impose such a “profits” limitation through the charters of the corporations it 
authorized.  The 1694 charter of the Bank of England provided that “no dividend shall at any 
time be made by the said governor and company save only out of the interest, profit or produce 
arising by or out of the said capital stock or fund, or by such dealing, buying, or selling as is 
allowed by the said Act of Parliament.”330  This type of limitation continued during the special 
charter era in America, although the provisions tended to be ad hoc in nature.331  In 1825, New 
York enacted the first general dividend statute in the country, which limited dividends to “surplus 
profits arising from the business of such corporations.”332  This became the model for nineteenth 
century general corporation law provisions governing dividends.333  There was still little 
agreement as to how to distinguish between profits and capital, but it was well established that 
such a distinction itself was important.334
2. Penalties for dividends paid out of capital
A second rule imposed penalties on the directors and stockholders for any distribution of 
dividends out of capital.  When Parliament authorized an increase in the capital stock of the Bank 
of England in 1697, it provided that if the corporation issued a dividend that reduced its capital 
stock without first reducing its outstanding debt, the stockholders “shall be severally liable” to 
any creditors of the Bank.335  A similar rule was imported to America, where a commonly cited 
Massachusetts statute provided that “[i]f the directors of any such company shall declare and pay 
any dividend, when the company is insolvent or any dividend, the payment of which would 
render it insolvent, they shall be jointly and severally liable for all the debts of the company” in 
an amount not to exceed the amount of the dividend.336  The New York statute was even broader, 
imposing liability on the directors if a dividend reduced the capital stock of the company, even if 
it did not induce insolvency.337  By the end of the century, New York had gone one step further, 
making it a misdemeanor to declare a dividend out of the capital stock of the corporation.338  In 
general, these director liability statutes were made necessary by the conferral of limited liability 
on corporate stockholders.  As one early observer noted, “if limited liability was to survive, a rule 
329
 Kehl, supra note 326, at 38 nn.12-13 (citing COURT MINUTES OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY 1660-1663 xx-xxi, 131 
(1922)).
330 J.W. GILBART, I THE HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE OF BANKING 32-33 (revised and edited by A.S. Michie 
1882).
331
 Kehl, supra note 326, at 43-51.
332
 N.Y. Laws chap. 325, § 2 (1825).
333
 Kehl, supra note 326, at 61.
334 See MORAWETZ, supra note 328, §§ 437-39, at 411-414.
335
 Kehl, supra note 326, at 42.
336
 Mass. Rev. Stat, chap 38, par. 331, § 23 (1836).
337
 N.Y. Laws chap. 325, § 2 (1825).
338 See Munson, supra note 328, at 193.
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against impairment of corporate capital by dividends or other repayments to stockholders was 
inevitable.”339
3. Dividends under the sole discretion of the board of directors
A third rule, which followed naturally from the first two, was that a corporation’s 
directors had the sole discretion to determine whether to declare a dividend.  This was made clear 
early on in the development of dividend limitations in this country.  Alexander Hamilton drafted 
a charter for the Bank of North America that authorized the directors to “make from time to time 
such dividends, out of the profits, as they may think proper.”340  A similar provision in the Bank 
of United States’ charter permitted as much dividends out of profits “as shall appear to the 
directors advisable.”341  As one commentator affirmed, by the early 1890s there was little doubt 
as to the board of directors’ power over whether to declare a dividend:  “The directors, being the 
agents of the corporation, alone have the power to determine the amount and to declare a 
dividend from its earnings – a power resting in their honest discretion, uncontrollable by the 
courts, when not exercised illegally, wantonly or oppressively.”342
Under this highly developed legal infrastructure, a stockholder had little legal recourse in 
the event the directors of a corporation chose not to distribute a dividend. There were some cases 
that appeared to support a stockholder’s right to petition for the division of surplus profits,343 but 
these cases relied primarily on exceptions, rather than alternatives, to the rule.  Henry Ballantine 
wrote that "there must be bad faith or a clear abuse of discretion on their part to justify a court of 
equity in interfering" in the directors' determination of dividend policy.344  The right to a dividend 
339
 Kehl, supra note 326, at 41.
340 Id. at 46 (italics added).
341 Id.
342
 Munson, supra note 328, at 196.  There were occasional exceptions, but these were rare.  See ARTHUR STONE 
DEWING, I THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 91 n. dd (5th ed. 1953) (“In rare cases the dividends are declared 
by the stockholders, in accordance with a provision of the bylaws.  Among early corporations the stockholders’ control 
over dividend disbursement was quite usual.  Such a reservation of power is now very rare; it runs counter to the 
generally accepted theory of the powers and responsibilities of directors.”).
343 See Scott v. Eagle Fire Co., 7 Paige ch. 198 at 125 (1838) “should they without reasonable cause refuse to divide 
what is actually surplus profits, the stockholders are not without remedy, if they apply to the proper tribunal before the 
corporation has become insolvent.”); Smith v. Prattville Manufacturing Co., 29 Ala. 503, 507-08 (1857) (“They may be 
compelled to exercise that discretion, if they improperly fail or reuse to exercise it.  But when they have exercised it, 
without any violation of the charter or constitution of the company, their action cannot be disregarded or controlled by 
any court, at the instance of a stockholder, unless it is shown to have been a willful abuse of their discretion, or the 
result of bad faith, or of a willful neglect or breach of a known duty.”).
344 BALLANTINE, supra note 298, at 507.  Ballantine further explained 
The mere fact that a corporation has surplus profits out of which a dividend might lawfully be declared is not 
of itself sufficient ground for a court of equity to compel the directors to make a dividend, for they have a 
right to use surplus profits to extend the business of the corporation, or to make improvements, and to 
establish various reserves, if it is to the interests of the corporation to do so, and a court of equity will not 
interfere with or control their discretion in determining what the interests of the corporation require in this 
respect, unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.
Id.
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was, in effect, not a right at all.  As one contemporary commentator described it, “[t]he right of a 
stockholder to share in the surplus of profits is in the nature of an inchoate right, until a 
distribution or dividend has been actually declared by the proper officers of the corporation.”345
Justice Thomas Cooley, writing on behalf of the Michigan Supreme Court, explained “until the 
dividend is declared . . . the dividend is only something that may possibly come into 
existence.”346
4. Business custom
Corporate managers used their legal discretion to justify adherence to a corporate finance 
norm favoring retained earnings.  While the conventional wisdom during much of the nineteenth 
century had been to distribute all or almost all of a corporation's earnings as dividends and raise 
expansion capital through the debt or equity markets,347 by World War I the conventional wisdom 
was that a corporation should “plow back” a substantial percentage of its earnings to fund 
expansion, protect against downturns, maintain regular dividend policies, and provide for 
unexpected expenses.348  In his 1917 treatise on business finance, William Lough noted that "[i]t 
is generally agreed that regular dividends combined with large -- or at least adequate -- savings 
out of annual income should be features of the financial management of most corporations."349  A 
few years later, one observer reported that "[t]oday it is taken for granted that no corporation 
shall pay out more than a fraction of its earnings."350
The available data suggests that this development in corporate finance theory was 
followed by a majority of companies.  While dividends hovered around 80 to 90 percent of 
earnings prior to the turn-of-the-century, they had dropped to approximately 50 to 60 percent of 
earnings during the first few decades of the twentieth century.351  According to one study, the 
majority of companies retained as much as fifty-five percent of their earnings during the period 
between 1922 and 1930.352
This retained earnings norm was bolstered by a corresponding norm in favor of regular 
dividends, rather than dividends that fluctuated with earnings.  In the 1926 edition of his 
345
 H.W.R., Dividends, 9 CENT. L.J. 161, 163 (1879).
346
 Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31 Mich. 76, 78 (1874).
347 See Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends?  Evidence from History, 56 TAX L. 
REV. 463, 467-68 (2003).
348 KENNETH S. VAN STRUM, INVESTING IN PURCHASING POWER 24 (1926) ("A corporation often invests a part of its 
income in new plants and in equipment, which means that instead of paying out all of its income in dividends it 'plows 
back' into the company some of its earnings for the future benefit of the stockholder.").
349 WILLIAM LOUGH, BUSINESS FINANCE 477 (1917).
350
 Oswald W. Knauth, The Place of Corporate Surplus in the National Income, 18 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 157, 164 (June 
1922).  
351 See COWLES COMMISSION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS, COMMON-STOCK INDEXES 2 (2d ed., 1939) (“COWLES 
COMMISSION”); Jack W. Wilson & Charles P. Jones, An Analysis of the S&P 500 Index and Cowles's Extensions:  Price 
Indexes and Stock Returns, 1870-1999, 75 J. BUS. 505, 527-531, Appendix:  Table A1 (2002) (standardizing and 
updating the data originally compiled by the Cowles Commission for the period 1871 through 1939).  
352 Id. at 35 (sample size was seventy-two companies).
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corporate finance treatise, Arthur Dewing noted that "[t]he regularity of dividend payments helps 
the corporation in two very important respects.  It creates a loyal group of stockholders who hold 
their stock for investment and not for speculation.  It also creates a strong credit to be utilized for 
borrowing in the open market."353
The demand for regular or level dividends was in part a byproduct of the introduction of 
preferred stock.  The early American corporation only had one class of stock and each 
shareholder had the same right to dividends as any other shareholder.354  Starting around the 
middle of the nineteenth century, however, transportation companies, particularly in the railroad 
industry, began to offer a preferred level of stock as a method of attracting equity capital.355
These securities had characteristics of both debt and equity.  They provided for guaranteed 
dividend rates similar to interest payments on debt, but the holder could not foreclose on the 
instrument if his dividends fell in arrears.356  Toward the end of the century, the preferred stock 
method expanded to industrial securities,357 where the guaranteed dividend rate was attractive in 
unregulated industries with little or no financial disclosure.  For the individual who formerly 
invested exclusively in debt securities, preferred stock was a middle ground between the risk of 
common stock and the relative certainty of debt.358
Although a board of directors could refuse to issue any preferred dividend at all, there 
was significant pressure to distribute the promised amount.  The fact that most early preferred 
stocks appeared to have been issued on a cumulative basis only increased this pressure.359  The 
cumulative feature meant a board of directors deciding against declaring a dividend in a 
particular year first would have to pay the preferred stockholders for all past and current 
dividends due before paying any dividend to the common stockholders.  While this provision 
helped attract capital by making the equity instrument seem more debt-like, it further increased 
353 ARTHUR STONE DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 549 (rev. ed. 1926).
354 See George Heberton Evans, Jr., The Early History of Preferred Stock in the United States, 19 AM. ECON. REV. 43, 
43 (1929) (“Early History”).
355 Id.; JONATHON BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 152 (1997); George 
Heberton Evans, Preferred Stock in the United States 1850-1878, 21 AM. ECON. REV. 56, 56 (1931).
356 BASKIN & MIRANTI, JR., supra note 355, at 152.  Some corporations even allowed the preferred stock holder to 
participate in dividends beyond the guaranteed rate in certain circumstances, but this was the exception rather than the 
rule.  Id.; W.H.S. Stevens, Stockholders’ Participations in Profits. I, 9 J. BUS. U. CHI. 114, 121-22 (1936) (noting with 
respect to a 1902 issuance of preferred stock by the American Brake Shoe and Foundry Company in which the 
preferred stock received all the residual profits after the common stock was paid a fixed dividend, that “[t]his type of 
issue is so rare, however, as to constitute something of a curiosity, although one would be rash to assert that no other 
such issues have been made.”).
357 See George Heberton Evans, Jr., Early Industrial Preferred Stocks in the United States, 40 J. POL. ECON. 227, 227 
(1932); Thomas R. Navin & Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-1902, 34 BUS. HIST. 
REV. 105, 116 (1955).
358 BASKIN & MIRANTI, JR., supra note 355, at 152.
359 See Evans, Early History, supra note 354, at 56; ARTHUR STONE DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS
124 (1919) (noting that while early preferred stock was often non-cumulative because of the speculative nature of 
industrial enterprises, by 1897, when many businesses were on more stable ground, the preferred dividend rate was 
commonly made cumulative).  Even when a charter was ambiguous on this point, courts generally found the preferred 
stock to be cumulative on the grounds that the preferred stockholder implicitly contracted for a certain rate of dividends 
regardless of the profits of the corporation.  Evans, Early History, supra note 354, at 61-62.
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the pressure to meet the preferred dividend payment.360  Managers could avoid the binding nature 
of the cumulative provision by inducing the preferred shareholders to agree to a 
recapitalization,361 but in practice they paid dividends whenever possible.362
The advent of preferred stock not only introduced the notion of a guaranteed dividend 
rate for preferred stockholders, but also created the climate for a quasi-guaranteed, regular 
dividend for all stockholders.  Although a corporation could continue to pay the preferred 
dividend while choosing to pass on dividends for holders of the common stock, discriminating 
between the classes of stock was often difficult.  This was especially true when promoters had 
promised that the common stockholders would receive a regular dividend.  One observer noted 
that “to the holders of common stock it seemed unreasonable and unjust that, in such prosperous 
times, a discrimination should be made in favor of the preferred stock.  The reputation of the 
management of many of the industrial combinations was seriously injured by their failure to 
redeem their promises of dividends on the common stock."363
As stock ownership spread, the demand for regularity in dividend payments increased.364
Whereas fewer than 4.5 million individuals owned stock in 1900, more than triple that number --
almost 14.5 million -- owned shares by 1922.365  The growth in stock ownership not only 
increased the size of the stockholding population, it changed the face of the typical stockholder.  
For example, by World War I stock ownership had spread to middle income individuals.366  This 
new type of stockholder viewed dividends as a one of his or her primary sources of income.  One 
economist, writing in 1924, noted that over the last twenty-five years, "[t]he tendency toward a 
more democratic distribution of beneficiary interests in the corporations of the country has been 
attended by an increase in the number of people who are getting a portion of their income from 
their accumulated savings."367  Although stockholders may have been worse off in the long term 
360
 As one commentator noted in chronicling the rise of the United States Steel Corporation, “[n]o matter how 
necessary the passing of their early dividends and accumulation of large reserves by the steel trusts may be judged to 
have been, so far as the preferred stock was concerned, in view of the cumulative provisions included in the contract 
with this class of stockholders, it was impossible.” Edward Sherwood Meade, The Genesis of the United States Steel 
Corporation, 15 Q. J. ECON. 517, 524 (1901). 
361 See DEWING, supra note 359, at 125-26 ("if a considerable amount of the unpaid dividends accumulate, and the 
company meets with more prosperous conditions, the managers, who probably control the common stock, will often try 
to induce the preferred shareholders to surrender their claims on the plea of some equitable adjustment."). 
362 Id. at 125 ("If the corporations earns the dividend on the preferred it will probably be paid; if it does not earn the 
dividend and the directors 'adjust' the books so that they may pay the dividend, lest the obligation accumulate, the 
preferred stockholders are not only deceived, but also have lasting injury done to their interests."); Meade, supra note 
360, at 524.
363
 Meade, supra note 360, at 525.
364 See Donald E. Wilbur, A Study of the Policy of Dividend Stabilization, 10 HARV. BUS. REV. 373, 373 (1932) ("With 
the expansion of the stock market and the wide distribution of equities among the American public, new significance 
has been placed upon the importance of maintaining regular dividends year in and year out.").
365
 H.T. Warshow, The Distribution of Corporate Ownership in the United States, 39 Q. J. ECON. 15, 15 (1924).
366 Id. at 17.  It also spread to new demographic groups such as women.  LOUGH, supra note 349, at 441 (noting, for 
example, that "[a]pproximately half the stockholders of the New Haven Railroad are women.").
367
 Warshow, supra note 365, at 15.  Joseph Kennedy, writing a few years later, concurred in this assessment, 
observing that "millions of people have become investors in securities and count upon continuity of their dividend
returns in budgeting their living expenses.  Anything that would interrupt the continuous flow of dividends will rob the 
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by the more conservative dividend policies,368 regularity was important both for stockholders 
who depended upon the dividends for monthly expenses and for those who saw dividends as a 
signal of a stable financial company.
Corporations took advantage of this demand for regularity by publicly announcing their 
shifts in dividend policy.369 The United States Rubber Company, for example, had been 
characterized by wildly erratic earnings and dividends since its founding in 1892.370  In 1911, 
after an eleven-year drought in dividend payments, the company announced that it would 
commence paying a four percent regular annual dividend on its common stock.371  As a result of 
this move, United States Rubber’s stock rose twelve points in less than two weeks, underscoring 
the importance of regularity for common stockholders.372
The problem with regular dividends was that the earnings of all companies fluctuated to 
some extent.  During down years, a corporation would not be able to pay out the dividend and the 
goal of regularity would be defeated.  As Dewing observed "[a] regularity of dividend payments 
must therefore be superimposed on an irregularity of earnings."373  To achieve this result, experts 
advised companies to retain a certain amount of their earnings each year as a cushion.  Lough 
warned that "dividends must not be allowed to rise, even in the most prosperous periods, above a 
conservative estimate of the minimum earnings of the company."374  While corporations did 
sometimes deviate from this conservative dividend policy to distribute additional amounts in a 
particularly profitable year, they maintained a policy of regularity by referring to such amounts as 
an "extra" or "special" dividend paid on top of the regular dividend.375
IV. CONCLUSION
The influence of legal and non-legal norms of corporate behavior on the fate of corporate 
tax initiatives may have significant relevance for modern tax policy.  In the New Deal examples 
thrifty American investor of part of his livelihood."  Joseph P. Kennedy, Big Business, What Now?, THE SATURDAY 
EVENING POST, Jan. 16, 1937, at 80.
368 See O.J. Curry, Utilization of Corporate Profits in Prosperity and Depression, 9 MICH. BUS. STUD. 1, 17 (1941); 
BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS:  PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE 375-76 (2d ed. 1940).
369
 In 1907, for example, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company announced an $8 per year regular dividend. 
See DEWING, supra note 342, at 763 n. ee.
370 Id. at 548 n. j.
371 Dividend on Rubber Common, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1911, at 15.  In an announcement regarding the move, the 
company’s president explained “notwithstanding the fact that for some years past the surplus net earnings have been 
considerably in excess of the sum required for dividends upon the preferred stocks, the Directors have felt it for the 
best interests of the company to defer payments on the company.”  Id.  He attributed the current move to a substantial 
gain from their automobile tire line.  Id.
372 Id.
373 DEWING, supra note 353, at 547.
374 LOUGH, supra note 349, at 444.
375 See, e.g., Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 1907, at 13 ("At a meeting of the Board of Directors of the New York 
Produce Exchange Bank, held this day, a semi-annual dividend of Three (3%) Per Cent was declared and an extra 
dividend of One (1%) Per Cent payable April 15th.").  See also DEWING, supra note 353, at 561 (noting that it is called 
an "extra" dividend to signal to the shareholders that it is not permanent).
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described in this paper, corporate managers fiercely resisted a measure that attempted to impose a 
new norm of corporate behavior – a norm of higher dividends and limited managerial discretion 
over dividend policy.  By contrast, corporate managers only offered minimal resistance to a 
measure that merely reinforced an existing norm of corporate behavior – the norm of state, 
federal, and shareholder oversight for mergers and acquisitions – and those changes have 
essentially endured to the modern day.  While there is no evidence whether either tax measure did 
have, or could have had, the effect on the underlying corporate behavior that Congress intended 
to regulate, the difference in the fate of each measure is a cautionary tale for corporate reformers 
seeking to enact governance measures through the tax code.  If the New Deal examples are not 
atypical -- an important qualifier in determining the modern relevance of any historical study --
the implication is that Congress can reinforce existing norms through the Code, but it will have 
more difficulty if it seeks to initiate such norms through the tax laws.
Far from being atypical, the New Deal examples studied in this piece have modern
analogies.  For instance, the corporate norms-based explanation may help explain the outcome of 
recent attempts to use the tax code to regulate corporate governance in the area of executive 
compensation.  In 1993, Congress enacted Section 162(m) in an attempt to control excessive 
executive compensation.376  Under this provision, corporations are subject to a $1 million cap on 
the deductibility of compensation provided to any of its top five executives, subject to an 
exception for "any remuneration payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more 
performance goals."377  In this case, the exception was designed to swallow the rule.  As one 
Treasury official explained, Section 162(m) "was not intended to be a revenue raising provision, 
but a behavior-shaping provision. The exception for performance-based compensation 'is not a 
loophole.'"378  The intention was to encourage corporations to switch from guaranteed salary 
arrangements to more performance-based executive compensation packages, including those 
centered around company stock and stock options in order to better align pay with 
performance.379
While Section 162(m) has survived, it has been undermined through managerial 
resistance and avoidance.   According to one observer, the rule is “completely inoperative” as a 
limit on executive compensation.380  It has failed to stem the growth of executive compensation 
packages and business leaders and tax lawyers believe that it has actually “encouraged bloated 
executive pay” by creating a $1 million minimum wage for executives and a push for large stock 
option grants.381  According to one report, “’executive pay actually rose at a 29 percent faster rate 
in the first year after the law took effect than in the previous 14 years after the service had 
376
 Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 469 (codified at I.R.C. § 162(m)).
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379 See Bank, Devaluing Reform, supra note 22, at 305-06 (1995).
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collected comparable information.’  From 1994 to 1995, corporate deductions for executive pay 
increased more than 9.1%, compared with an average increase of 7% between 1980 and 1994.”382
Moreover, early on corporate managers found ways to subvert the original goal of aligning pay 
with performance by resorting to the derivatives market.383  Many prominent investors and 
former government officials have now admitted defeat and are calling for the provision’s 
repeal.384
When viewed from the perspective of the underlying corporate norm at stake, this 
outcome should have been quite predictable.  While early charters sometimes fixed the corporate 
managers’ salaries or made them subject to a vote of a majority of the stockholders,385 executive 
compensation has long been the exclusive province of the board of directors.  As the author of 
one treatise observed in 1933, “[s]alaries paid to officers must bear some reasonable relation to 
the value of their services.  But courts will not review salaries voted by the board unless they are 
so clearly excessive as to amount a fraud upon the corporation.”386  Recently, securities laws have 
attempted to impose various disclosure requirements for executive compensation,387 but 
shareholders still have no say in the compensation process under state laws and they tend to 
remain quite passive even when the information is disclosed.388  Thus, managers are likely to 
resist attempts to indirectly control compensation through the tax code and shareholders are not 
going to view such resistance as in violation of existing norms.
This attempt to override existing corporate norms is what distinguishes tax provisions 
such as Section 162(m) from those tax provisions that have been praised for their corporate 
governance benefits by modern scholars. David Schizer, for instance, has argued that taxation is 
an ally in the corporate governance arena by providing constraints on executives seeking to 
reduce the incentive effects of their options to purchase employer stock.389  Through rules 
governing exit strategies with respect to options, such as the disincentive to exercise under 
Section 83 and the disincentives to hedging resulting from both the constructive sale rules and the 
mismatch between capital and ordinary rates in a hedge, the tax system helps to bolster the 
incentive effects.390 Schizer concedes, however, that “[a]lthough Congress sometimes 
382 See Susan J. Stabile, Is There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 
88 (1998) (quoting David Cay Johnston, Executive Pay Increases at a Much Faster Rate than Corporate Revenues and 
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deliberately uses the tax code to pursue corporate governance objectives, the tax constraints on 
exercising and hedging options do not fall into this category.”391  Some of the advantage in this 
case may be that the rules in question did not appear to constitute a threat, but the distinction runs 
deeper. 
The corporate benefits in this case may be more than a mere indirect benefit of provisions 
adopted on tax policy grounds, but may in fact be the direct benefit of tax provisions that support
existing corporate norms of behavior rather than trying to install new ones.  In the case of 
hedging, Schizer found that firms either banned the practice directly or raised its costs indirectly 
by preventing executives from pledging their option grants.392  While he considered such 
constraints to be ineffective or incomplete,393 they suggest that executive hedging of option grants 
are disfavored under corporate law and practice.  Schizer confirms this by predicting that if the 
tax limitations were repealed, shareholders and executives would likely cooperate in erecting 
contract and securities law barriers to fill the gap.394  Thus, the use of tax law in this instance was 
merely to reinforce this existing norm of corporate behavior rather than to change it altogether.  
This appears to help explain why tax may have been an ally of corporate governance measures in 
limiting executive hedging while being either ineffective or counterproductive in controlling 
executive compensation more generally.
Thus, at least in these examples norms appear to have some relevance in distinguishing 
between corporate governance-oriented tax provisions.  While more study may be beneficial on 
this point, the basic premise is intuitively appealing.  Provisions that help reinforce existing 
norms may be better received, which will aid in their prospects for long-term success.  By 
contrast, those provisions designed to initiate new norms or overturn existing ones are much more 
likely to face opposition and fail.   The implication of the historical evidence seems clear:  Tax 
can be considered an ally of corporate governance, but not a de facto system of federal corporate 
law.  
391 Id. at 466.
392 Id. at 460.
393 Id.
394 Id. at 495.
